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PREFACE
Electronic communication remained captive of wire for more than a 
half century before a technique could be found to set it free. A major 
breakthrough in electronic communication occurred in 1873 when James 
Clerk-Maxwell published A Treatise on Electricity & Magnetism in which 
he established the theory of electromagnetic energy, supported by mathe­
matical proofs and based on observation of visible light.^ Within a 
decade experiments conducted by Heinrich Hertz which confirmed Maxwell’s 
concepts served as the scientific basis for the first radio transmissions. 
Radio telephone instruments were perfected by the inventor Guglielmo 
Marconi which stimulated experiments in similar areas of wireless trans­
mission. By 1907 Lee de Forest had patented the vacuum-tube which set 
the stage for television broadcasting. Within two decades an entertain­
ment/information industry began to form around this new technology. Now, 
a half century later, radio and television stations have access to nearly 
every American family. Yet, in this time of spiraling scientific ad­
vances the broadcast industry faces a new challenge, not from a more 
complex mode of electronic signal dissemination, but from a system 
which has returned to wire to deliver its message. This is but one 
paradox in the maze or contradictions known as community antenna tele­
vision (CATV).
\
Cable television began in 1949^  when television repairmen in the 
mountainous areas of Pennsylvania and Oregon, attempting to gain clearer
^Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America, 2nd ed. (New Yorki 
Houghton Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 117.
TV reception, fed distant television signals into rural areas normally 
out of the signal's range, A master antenna apparatus was erected to 
receive television signals which were amplified and distributed to sub­
scribers through a network of coaxial cables--wires capable of trans- 
mi tting high frequency signals.
The Federal Communications Commission began efforts to determine 
proper legal categories for various cable television operations in 1952, 
continuing these attempts on an intermittent basis until 1959 without 
notable success. The failure of the FCC to settle upon a single suc­
cinct statement either categorizing CATV within an existing legal term 
or to create a new category with clearly defined legal attributes left 
a jurisprudential vacuum the courts were forced to fill. Cable tele­
vision is simple to explain in terms of basic function but very difficult 
to define in terms of economic implications, especially as its activities 
intermesh with the broadcasting industry. Essentially, it is an audience 
or subscriber-financed method of enhancing and expanding reception of 
existing television programming. This single factor of public support 
rather than advertiser support has stimulated the major controversies 
about present cable operations and has generated both the highest hopes 
and greatest fears about its ultimate potential.
CATV has been described as a parasite industry sapping 
program creativity, and a broadcast ally enhancing pro­
gram diversity; an alien concept threatening our free sys­
tem of communication, and a salutory force allowing 
minority opinions public access..2
2Don Le Due, Community Antenna Television as a Challenger of 
Broadcast Regulatory* Policy (unpublished Ph.D. dissertation, Univer- 
sity of Wisconsin, 1970), p. 2.
The author became interested in cable television over two years 
ago while working as local program origination assistant at a major 
cable company in northern California. Several ideas were discussed as 
to what types of local programming should be offered to adequately 
serve a town comprised of various population groups. This sparked per­
sonal interest in the common carrier/public access issue.
Through broadcasting history regulatory problems have been crucial. 
This study will examine one facet of the Federal Communication Commis­
sion's efforts to classify the numerous legal aspects of^CATV in rela­
tion to the economic and technological transitions inherent in the 
industry, specifically the issue of regulating cable television sys­
tems as common carriers. Presently, CATV is suffering from an identity 
complex. Does a cable operation fit into the category of a broadcast 
station as we now know it, is it a common carrier or is a new 
classification warranted?
This study will begin with a historical examination of the dif­
ficulty of pinpointing a definition of common carrier. CATV common 
carrier operations will be discussed in relation to technological 
feasibility, economic factors and possible programming conflicts. 
Although it may be impossible to discover a concise answer or formula, 
an attempt will be made to provide a basis for policy decisions and 
future projections. It is unquestionably a difficult task to define 
and classify essential legal elements of an organization in process of 
both economic and technological transition but ambiguity at this basic 
level can only increase the difficulty of making intelligent decisions 
at a more complex stage of regulatory deliberation.
TV
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CHAPTER I
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE OF THE COMMON CARRIER DOCTRINE
The evolution of the Western World's economy into a corporate 
structure with large-scale finance and production has altered the com­
mon carrier concept. In the early days the common carrier was a 
hoyman or a tailor, but the technological revolution of the nineteenth 
and twentieth centuriesTnade it possible to construct large ocean 
vessels, railways and airplanes, thereby raising the question whether 
the common carrier doctrine also applied to these new industries.^
The. concept of the common carrier in legal application has several 
facets still frequently used and applied in different connections, but 
fts precise meaning is rarely made clear. The complexity of common 
carrier doctrine results from a diversity of events that have confronted 
and influenced each other during a long period of time.
The most frequent definition of this concept designates a common 
carrier to be one who holds himself out to the public in general to 
carry for them in return for compensation. One of the regulations is 
that the common carrier may not pick and choose among his customers 
but has to serve them all without discrimination. Secondly, a common
carrier can only demand a reasonable fee in return for reasonable
. 2service.
^Lars Gorton, The Concept of the Common Carrier in Anglo-American 
Law (Gothenburg, Sweden: Akademiforlaget, 197l), pi 22.
Russell E. Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation (New Jersey: 
Prentice-Hall, 1952), p. 92.
2 *
Perhaps this definition sufficed at a time when no notices or
special contracts were used, notices limiting the sphere of the carrier's
profession to certain routes, to certain classes of goods and notices
limiting the carrier's liability. Now, though, this definition seems
less precise and "it becomes difficult to distinguish the prerequisites
3for being a common carrier from the consequences of being one."
Through the mixture of ideas that join together in the 
common carrier concept one may reach the definition 
that "he is a common carrier who is a common carrier," 
for he who holds himself out to the general public is 
a common carrier, and he who is a common carrier must 
hold himself out to carry for anybody who chooses to 
use him. This circular reasoning is imprecise and un­
satisfactory but the mentioned definition still seems 
to be the accepted one.4
The difficulty of pinpointing a definition of common carrier can 
be understood by tracing the modification of this doctrine and its 
changing applicability to different industries. The term "common 
carrier" did not appear until the late 1800's but the concept 
originated in the Middle Ages with the concept of "common callings." 
Common callings developed under the guild system in England and 
related to activities considered essential to community life which 
were undertaken by those who were given specific authorization to do 
so. These activities were related to the public interest and those 
who performed such services were not only subject to special obliga­
tions but could also be regulated by the Crown even though a special 
grant of monopoly privilege had been afforded. Historians disagree
Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 11. 
^Ibid.
3as to which public occupations fell within the jurisdiction of common
callings. Persons regarded as exercising a public employment included
carriers, innkeepers, surgeons, smiths, farriers, tailors, ferrymen,
5
sheriffs, taverners, victuallers and gaolers. A few historians have 
questioned whether smiths were common callers, while other historians 
have excluded carriers in their discussion.
Liability Issue Obligates Common Carriers 
To Deliver Goods Safely
Although specific guidelines for liability were not established 
until 1703, early common callers were required to perform their ser­
vices in good faith and trust, under the law of bailment.*
The liability arose from the fact of a person holding 
a definite status to which the liability was annexed 
by law, and the skill required in different callings 
together with the corresponding degree of responsibility 
varied with the different species of employment. Thus 
the gaoler warranted against a breaking of the gaol, 
but not against fire; the smith warranted against 
pricking the horse; the innkeepers against theft but 
not against other sorts of injury; the carriers against 
theft on the road but probably not against theft at the 
inn. It will be observed that in no case did the ob­
ligation implied by law amount to an obligation to 
insure against all events.6
In the early law there was no difference between private carriers 
and common carriers and the liability of all carriers had as a common 
source the status of bailees. This status created a liability indepen­
dent of any compensation or contract. Usually common carriers were
^Ibid., p. 25.
^Ibid., pp. 25-26.
*A delivery of goods or money by one person to another in trust, 
for some special purpose, upon a contract, expressed or implied, that 
the trust shall be faithfully executed.
regarded as those who "held out" to carry for everyone, while private 
carriers entered into business with particular persons. Under the 
English common law "a carrier is a person who carries goods or passen­
gers whether for reward or not, by land or by w a t e r . Y e t  this 
definition did not say whether the carrier is he who undertakes the 
transport or he who actually performs it.
The 16th and 17th centuries were a period of confusion in legal 
theory. The development of contracts seemed to clarify the definition 
of common carrier by specifying that the promise to carry was a pre- 
requiste for being a carrier. But the issue of liability became 
muddled in conflicting doctrines. A few historians proposed that a 
carrier was liable only if he demanded a charge. Others claimed that 
a common carrier may always demand a reasonable charge and he is not 
obligated to carry under any non-payment arrangements; but if a common
carrier does agree to carry without charge, his liability may be less 
8
restrictive. Coggs v. Bernard (1705) has been regarded as one of the
9
most important cases in establishing the common carrier liability.
The case concerned the defendant Bernard who undertook to carry cases 
of brandy from one cellar to another. One of the cases broke, according 
to the plaintiff, through the negligence of the defendant. Regarding 
the common law liability of carriers, the decision read in part:
7
Ibid., p. 53.
O
Olsen v. Draper, 112 F. Supp., 1953, p. 859.
9
Orville Holmes, The Common Law, ed. by M. D. Howe (Cambridge,
Mass: 1963), p. 155.
5. . .  a delivery to carry or otherwise manage, for a 
reward to be paid to the bailee, those cases are of two 
sorts; either a delivery to one that exercises a public 
employment, or a delivery to a private person. First 
if it be to a person of the first sort, and he is to 
have a reward, he is bound to answer for the goods at all 
events. And this is the case of the common carrier, 
common hoyman, master of a ship, etc: . . . The law 
charges this person thus intrusted to carry goods, 
against all events but acts of God, and of the enemies 
of the king . . . .  And this a politic establishment, 
contrived by the policy of the law, for the safety of 
all persons, the necessity of whose affairs oblige 
them to trust these sorts of persons, that they may be 
safe in their ways of dealing.
Two main principles can be derived from this opinion; a) that a 
person who exercises a public employment is a common carrier and b) 
that a common carrier carrying goods for charge has a liability for 
the safety of the goods, with the only exception being an act of God 
or the king’s enemies. This decision differentiated between the 
liability of a private carrier, now liable as an "ordinary” bailee for 
negligence only, and the common carrier with his severe and twofold 
liability.^ This seemingly simple clarification is nevertheless 
important in order to understand the later evolution of the common 
carrier doctrine. The issue of liability has been an important one 
throughout the history of common carriers. This study will reveal 
that this issue, although in a different context, is a major point 
of controversy between cable television operators and common carrier 
access advocates.
^Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 59.
^ Ibid., p. 66
6Common carriers were subject to absolute liability for loss of or
damage to goods (sometimes termed strict liability), whereas the
ordinary bailee was granted the possibility of contracting out of his
liability. The theory of contract was probably the most far-reaching
aspect of the Coggs v. Bernard case. "Originally the relation between
the carrier and his customers was thus not founded on contract but on
12the law of bailment." In the law of bailment the obligations of the 
parties were fixed beforehand by law. The use of contracts allowed 
the parties to agree to their respective obligations and immunities 
governed only by court rulings that prohibited relieving a carrier 
from liability for gross negligence.
The subsequent evolution of the common carrier doctrine was by no 
means unambiguous. It is difficult to clarify and structure the elements 
to formulate a precise doctrine or definition. The concept has under­
gone several changes; the common callers of the Middle Ages were very 
different from the common carriers of the twentieth century.
It is not always easy to determine to which class a 
particular carrier belongs for they rarely put their 
profession formally into writing though sometimes 
they give public notice that they are not Common 
Carriers of certain goods and so it generally has to 
be decided from their past conduct, the types of vehicles 
they use and the other surrounding circumstances 
. . . . but as long as a carrier is a Common Carrier 
he is in two quite different respects under a serious 
legal liability; one is his obligation to carry and 
the other is his liability for any loss or injury to 
the goods while in the course of carriage.13
12Ibid., p. 68. 
13Ibid., p. 69.
7Supreme Court Establishes Legal Foundation 
For Carrier Liability in Niagara v. Cordes
It was over a century after the Coggs v. Bernard case that the
United States Supreme Court thoroughly considered the common carrier
14
issue and gave an exhaustive description of it in Niagara v. Cordes
saying in part:
A common carrier is one who undertakes for hire to trans­
port the goods of those who may choose to employ him from 
place to place. He is, in general, bound to take the 
goods of all who offer, unless his complement for the 
trip is full, or the goods be of such a kind as to be 
liable to extraordinary danger, or such as he is unaccus­
tomed to convey. In all cases where there is no special 
agreement to the contrary, he is entitled to demand the 
price of carriage before he receives the goods; and if 
not paid, he may refuse to receive them; but if he take 
charge of them for transportation, the non-payment of 
the price of carriage in advance will not discharge, 
affect or lessen his liability as a carrier in the case, 
and he may afterwards recover the price of the service 
performed. When he receives the goods, it is his duty 
to take all possible care of them in their passage, make 
due transport and safe and right delivery of them at the 
time agreed upon . . . .  Common carriers are usually 
described as of two kinds, namely carriers by land and 
carriers by water. At common law, a carrier by land is 
in the nature of an insurer and is bound to keep and 
carry the goods entrusted to his care safely, and is 
liable for all losses, and in all events, unless he can 
prove that the loss happened from the act of God, or 
the public enemy, or by the act of the owner of the goods.
This extensive description emphasizes the complexity of the common 
carrier doctrine. The Court makes it evident that there is no simple 
definition that can be applied to common carriers, instead the Court 
seems to point out its intricate nature. Nevertheless there seem to 
be two basic principles that characterize a common carrier: a) dis­
tinction between the private and the common carrier points out the
14
The Propeller Niagara v. Joseph H. Cordes. 62 U.S., 1858, p. 7.
two main liabilities of the latter, one concerning the refusal to carry
15
and the other regarding loss of or damage to goods; b) "holds itself 
out" to the public as willing to carry all passengers and/or goods for 
hire indiscriminately.^
Willingness of the Shipping Industry to Safely Carry Goods 
For Hire Results in Common Carrier Status
If the task of defining common carrier seemed difficult to the
various judicial bodies, the task of determining which carriers were
to be regarded as common carriers must have seemed insurmountable.
The concept developed under pre-industrial times, but technology
brought new vehicles and complex management organizations. Perhaps
the first time the "old" common carrier doctrine was applied to a new
type of "industry" was in the mid-1800’s when shipowners were deemed
17to be common carriers. One leading case decided in the United States
Supreme Court expressed: »
By the settled law, in the absence of some valid agree­
ment to the contrary, the owner of a general ship 
carrying goods for hire, whether employed in internal, 
in coasting, or in foreign commerce, is a common car­
rier, with the liability of an insurer against all 
losses, except from such irresistible causes as the 
act of God and public enemies.
15Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 95.
^ Arrow Aviation, Inc., v. Moore» 266 F. 2d., 1959, p. 488; see 
also: United States v. Smith, 215 F. 2d., 1954, p. 217; Thomas v.
National Delivery Association, 24 F. Supp., (DC Pennsylvania),1937, 
p. 173.
^Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 93.
18Liverpool Steam Co. v. Phoenix Insurance Co., 129 U.S., 1888,
p • 436.
9A similar decision was reached in the Willdomino case:
The Willdomino was a general ship engaged in the common 
carriage of merchandise for hire. A carrier of goods 
by water like a carrier by land is an insurer, and 
though no actual blame is imputable to it, is absolutely 
liable, in the absence of a special contract limiting 
its liability, for all damages sustained by the goods 
intrusted to its care unless the damage is occasioned 
by the act of God, the public enemy, the public 
authority, the fault of the shipper, or the inherent 
nature of the thing shipped.19
Since the Willdomino case, several acts and laws governing water 
carriers have been passed. Since the history of the shipping industry 
is not the purpose of this study these will be examined only briefly. 
After World War I domestic shipping particularly in the coastal and 
intercoastal trading areas, was subject to severe competition, declining 
earnings and a need for some type of regulation. The Shipping Act of 
1916 created the U.S. Shipping Board and was granted the authority to 
promote and regulate deepwater shipping. Common carriers had to publish 
and file rates, fares and charges with the Board even though it could 
not fix minimum or actual rates. This action set a precedent, as this 
study will disclose, as most common carriers are required to file 
tariffs with theirregulatory agencies. In 1933 the Intercoastal 
Shipping Act was passed requiring common carriers operating in inter­
coastal trade via the Panama Canal to publish their actual rates. Five
years later an amendment gave the regulatory body authority to set
20minimum rates for domestic deepwater common carriers. The United 
States Maritime Commission, known today as the Federal Maritime
^^Wilidomino, The, 300 F., (3rd Cir.), 1924, p. 5; cert den. 270 
U.S., 1925, p. 647.
20
James Guandolo, Transportation Law (Dubuque, Iowa; 1965), p. 316.
10
Commission, was created through the Merchant Marine Shipping Act of
1936, which transferred to this Commission all the functions, powers
21
and duties formerly contained in all the previous shipping acts.
Water carriers regulated by the FMC were still required to file their 
tariffs but a certificate or permit to operate as an ocean carrier was 
not needed.
The question of liability was, of course, an important issue.
In 1893 the Harter Act was passed in order to give some uniformity to
the carrier's liability in water carriage. The main point of the Act
22
stated that it is the duty of the owner to make the ship seaworthy.
The ship owner is also liable for loss or damage of cargo usually based
23
on a maximum liability of $500 per ton, net or gross, as rated.
j j o  u a u i i o x i c o
Common Carrier Regulation for Railways 
The roots of common carrier laws are in road carriers and thus it 
should come as no surprise that many of the alterations in the doctrine 
came about during the development of the railroad industry. Railway 
traffic operated under the principles of the old English common laws 
which:
21Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 157.
22 See Southern Pacific S.S. Co. v. New Orleans Coal & Bisso Towboat 
Co.. Inc., 43 F. 2d., (DC Louisiana), 1930, p. 177; Fort Gaines, The,
24 F. 2d., (DC Maryland), 1928, p. 849; Sun Co. v. Healy, 163F., (2nd 
Cir.), 1908, p. 48.
Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 159.
11
• • . • demanded little more than that they should carry 
for all persons who applied, in the order to which the 
goods were delivered at the particular station and that 
their charges for transportation be reasonable.24
The first time the term "common carrier" was used in a formal
document, was in the Interstate Commerce Act of 1887. The act was
written by a special Senate committee upon the recommendation by
President Grant to make a thorough investigation of Federal railway 
25regulation. The Interstate Commerce Act prescribed twenty-four
provisions regarding railroad regulation of which six are applicable
to common carriers. These six provisions have been touched upon
previously, but the wording of the Commerce Act may add clarity.
First of all, a common carrier is one which hauls pas­
sengers or goods belonging to others. Second, it 
offers its services for hire. Third, it must under­
take to serve all who may apply for its services.
Fourth, it must serve without discrimination all 
those who are similarly circumstanced. Fifth, it 
must offer its services at reasonable rates. And 
sixth, it is expected to use more than ordinary care 
to assume the safe arrival of passengers and freight
at destination.26
Although the original Commerce Act was specifically designed to regu­
late the railway industry, it also applied to foreign and domestic 
transportation.
Joseph H. Tedrow, Regulation of Transportation: Practice and
Procedure before the Interstate Commerce Commission (Iowa: Wm. C.
Brown Co., 1955), p. 9. ~
25
Emory R. Johnson, Elements of Transportation, A Discussion of 
Steam, Railroad, Electric Railway, Ocean and Inland Water Transporta­
tion (New York: Kennikat Press, 1970), p. 141.
Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation, p. 94.
12
In its original wording the Interstate Commerce Act contained no
provisions concerning the common carrier's liability for goods beyond
its own lines when receiving them for shipment on their own lines.
Many times the rail carriers would issue bills of lading containing
clauses that relieved them from liability, often even in cases of 
27negligence. This lack of regulation,particularly the carrier's 
liability,resulted in the enactment of two amendments: namely, the 
Hepburn Act, 1906 (the Carmack amendment) and the Clayton Act, 1914 
(the Cummins amendment). The Hepburn Act extended the Commerce Com­
mission's jurisdiction to include all other facets of railway trans­
portation plus pipelines. A major provision of this 1906 legislation
28
empowered the ICC to set maximum rates and to enforce its own orders.
The Carmack amendment required the originating common carrier to issue
a receipt for a shipment and made the initial carrier responsible to
the holder of the receipt for damages occuring while the goods are in
29its custody or the custody of any succeeding carrier. Prior to the
enactment of the Carmack amendment there had been no clear definition
of a carrier's liability} now it was placed on the originating carrier.
However, in 1916 this was amended whereby both the initial and con-
30
necting carrier were made liable to the holder of the receipt.
27Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 153.
28Marvin L. Fair, Ernest W. Williams, Jr., Economics of Trans­
portation (New York: Harper <£ Brothers, 1950), p. 469.
29
Interstate Commerce Commission Reports, Vol. 33, 1915,
p. 682.
30
Gorton, Common Carrier in Anglo-American Law, p. 153.
13
St. Louis Railroad Terminal Case 
Prohibits Unreasonable Rates
During the evolution of the common carrier doctrine principles 
have emerged as various judicial and legislative agencies have assumed 
temporary or permanent authority over each industry. The primary re­
sponsibility of the early common callers was to their trade or craft 
which had to be essential to community life. The concept of respon­
sibility and public service slowly emerged and had become fairly well 
established by the time the shipping industry became this country's 
leading industry. If the developing railway industry could be credited 
with adding one more principle to the common carrier doctrine, that 
would be "rate regulation." Although the idea of charging reasonable 
rates did not gain full attention until after the telephone and tele­
graph companies fell under the authority of the Interstate Commerce 
Commission, it was conceived during the railroad era. This concept 
was expressed by the United States Supreme Court in U.S. v. St. Louis 
Railroad Terminal;
Under the Interstate Commerce Law, and indeed under 
the common law of the land, tolls must be reasonable, 
and the government has the power to make them so if 
they are not . . . .  The charge for service in any 
case can be stated in one word--cost. No money re­
ceived for the service rendered goes to any other 
purpose than paying expenses of operation, taxes, 
fixed charges and proper maintenance.^
31
U.S. v. Terminal Railroad Association of St. Louis, 224 U.S., 
1912, p. 385; see also: Texas and Pacific Railway v. Abilene Cotton
Oil Co., 204 U.S., 1906, p. 448.
14
Rate regulation was a provision of the Interstate Commerce Act, as men­
tioned above. But unreasonable rates and discrimination, undue prefer­
ence and combining agreements among railroads continued even after 
strict regulations had been set forth in various Supreme Court rulings.
To understand this is to come to grips with the growing complexity of 
the common carrier doctrine in corporate America, If common carriage
means the ability and willingness to be responsible for all traffic needs,
32then the rail carriers meet those tests exceptionally well. Not only 
can they absorb traffic that because of bad weather cannot move over
other agencies, but railways also have proved under general war con­
ditions to have the capacity to expand service with a minimum drain
on war essential resources. In short, the railroad industry has the
capacity to satisfactorily handle great traffic load.
Excess capacity was large, and provided the avenue to 
lower unit costs and rate levels--even to greater prof­
itability under discriminatory rates subject to regu­
latory approval. By obtaining relatively large revenue 
contributions above variable costs from many commodi­
ties and hauls, the rails could operate profitably as a 
whole, bear the social responsibilities of general com­
mon carriers, and even promote general economic develop­
ment by carrying other commodities at a loss or with 
only slight revenue contributions,33
Rate regulation is considered to be warranted in situations where compe­
tition is not adequate to protect against excessive rates, undue return 
from a monopoly franchise, discrimination or other abuse of the power.
32
James C, Nelson, Railroad Transportation and Public Policy 
(Washington, D,C,: Brookings Institute, 1959), p, 18,
33Ibid,
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Although the privately-owned railroads x^ ere subject to regulatory rates, 
their profits were substantially high. The common carrier doctrine pro­
posed that carriers' rates should be reasonable so that "anyone" who 
wanted access to a carrier's facilities could afford such service. This 
is the premise on which rate regulation was founded. By the very nature 
of its size and diversity of services, the railroads could, as is shown 
above, reap substantial profits despite rate regulations.
It was at this point that the common carrier doctrine underwent 
changes, and the difficulties of such status became apparent. In the 
St. Louis Railroad Terminal case it was clearly established that the 
money received for common carrier service was to go for paying ex­
penses of operation, etc. But the railroads were not only just breaking 
even, they were operating in the black. The dichotomy is obvious; on the 
one hand the common carrier was to operate at cost, while by the nature 
of its facilities the railways- became a profitable business. As a re­
sult a further complexity was added to the common carrier doctrine and 
as this study will reveal it is a majorpoint of contention in the cable tele­
vision industry. That is, what constitutes a fair rate of return? This 
question has yet to be answered due to not only the complexity of the 
common carrier doctrine but to the complexity of the industries to which 
it has been applicable.
Bell Telephone Entrepreneurs Promote Economic 
Gain as New Common Carrier Philosophy
High profits of common carriers became more acute when Bell patented
34the telephone in 1876. Prior to that time Western Union Telegraph
34 Harry M. Trebing, "Common Carrier Regulation--The Silent Crisis," 
Law &. Contemporary Problems, Vol. 34 , 1969 , p. 303.
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Company, chartered in 1851, achieved an early dominance in the field of
35
telecommunications and became the first nation wide monopoly, A con­
frontation seemed evident particularly after Western Union responded to 
the challenge of the Bell Company by devising an improved telephone.
But in 1879 an agreement was reached whereby Western Union agreed to 
stay out of voice communication and Bell agreed to stay out of the tele­
graph field.
Perhaps the most important event of this period occured 
when Theodore N, Vail became president of the Bell Tele­
phone Company, Vail proceeded to establish a corporate 
structure which was ultimately to become the dominant 
pattern for industrial organization for the entire 
common carrier industry, Vail viewed telecommunications, 
and particularly the telephone, as a nationwide, inter- ^  
woven system with the Bell Company as the dominant firm,
Vail's belief in a single telecommunications system and his actions to 
insure its development could be termed as the primary turning point in 
the changing common carrier doctrine. Two courses of action were imple­
mented to achieve Vail's objective. The first was the elimination of 
competition. Between 1894-95 most of the Bell patents had expired 
which opened the door for the independent telephone companies who began 
to challenge the Bell system, "The market structure of the common
carrier industry had changed drastically. For the first time, direct
37competition existed on an intra-industry basis." Bell answered the 
challenge by: a) denying financial resources to the Telephone,
35J Ibid.
Ibid.
37Ibld., p. 304.
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Telegraph & Cable Co. thereby destroying their effort to.develop a com­
petitive long-distance system; b) Bell companies refused to inter­
connect with non-Bell companies; and c) Bell pursued an aggressive
38program to buy up independent telephone properties.
By 1910, the threat of the independents had largely been 
overcome, and the stage was set for the universal service 
which Vail envisioned as the objective of the American 
common carrier system.39
The second course of action was the encouragement of Bell manage­
ment to cooperate with the state regulatory commissions. Regulation 
was somewhat permissive during this period. Federal regulation of
rates and practices of interstate communication carriers was initiated
40by the Mann-Elkins Act of 1910. But by this time Bell*s domination 
in the telephone and telegraph fields was extensive. However, Bell 
succumbed to government pressure and agreed to extend interconnection 
privileges to independent companies and divested itself of Western 
Union.*
It was during this era that the modern philosophy of common car­
rier regulation was established and the tools and techniques of control 
were developed. Two events contributed to the birth of this new phil­
osophy. First, the Interstate Commerce Commission continued to exercise
38iMd.
39
J Ibid., 305.
40
Truman C. Bigham, Merrill J. Roberts, Transportation (New York: 
McGraw Hill, 1952), p. 227.
Bell System had acquired control of Western Union in 1909 through 
a stock acquisition.
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limited regulation of telegraph and telephone companies, until the
passage of the Communications Act of 1934. Their regulation paralleled ..
that of the railroad industry, though.
Telegraph companies, for example, have been deemed to 
occupy the same relation to commerce as carriers of 
messages that railroads do as carriers of goods; and 
the same reasoning may be equally applied to telephone 
companies and other transmission agencies.
Although several modifications were required in the Interstate
Commerce Act to be made applicable to transmission agencies--telephone
and telegraph companies--these apparently were only in wording. For
example, the filing and posting of rates and charges, then required of
transportation common carriers was modified to state that telegraph
and telephone companies could establish their own rates, but these
42
rates must be reasonable. The point of this illustration is that 
regulation became preoccupied with the general level of earnings or 
revenue requirements rather than over matters affecting market structure. 
This is perhaps understandable when taking into consideration that the 
development of the telegraph and telephone industries overlapped that 
of the railroad industry, from a regulatory standpoint. High profits 
of the railways changed the "old" common carrier doctrine while the 
concentrated efforts of Theodore Vail altered the market structure; 
the two occuring almost simultaneously.
41Western Union Telegraph Co. v. State of Texas, 105 U.S., 1881,
p. 461.
42
Westmeyer, Economics of Transportation, p. 110.
^Trebing, "Silent Crisis," p. 306.
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What emerged was a philosophy of "natural monopoly" for 
common carrier communications in which the promotion of 
the public interest was equated with the maintenance of 
systematic integrity and the task of Dlanning for 
national and regional requirements. 4-3
Physical Nature of Radio Poses Common 
Carrier Regulatory Problems
The common carrier doctrine of the 19th and 20th centuries has 
changed as the way of doing business has changed. Its complexity may 
stem from the idea that the structure of the market, particularly during 
Vail's era, was changing faster than the common carrier doctrine. But 
the tables were about to be turned with the advent of wireless communica­
tion. Broadcast technology was about to transform common carrier commu­
nications from a relatively stable industry "to one in which change was
coming at a faster rate than it could be assimilated by existing market
44structures and institutions."
Many of the principles that were adopted to regulate transportation 
and transmission agencies were merely modified to fit broadcasting. But 
the nature of the medium was different and this posed new problems for 
Congress. Specifically, by whom and how was this new medium to be regu­
lated? One unsuccessful answer was a bill introduced before Congress 
that would have classified radio broadcasting as a "common carrier." Radio
would then be subjected to federal rate regulation and under the obligation to
45serve all those who sought the use of its facilities.
^Trebing, "Silent Crisis," p. 306.
^ I bid., p. 310.
Dickson Fricks, Jr., "Radio Broadcasting as a Common Carrier," 
Virginia Law Review, Vol. 19, 1932, p. 174.
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The first real legislative act governing broadcasting was the Wire­
less Ship Act of 1910 which empowered the Secretary of Commerce and
Labor to make'regulations applicable to radio. Radio in this early
46stage was utilized as a life saving device at sea. Two years later 
the Radio Act of 1912 was passed which made it illegal to operate a radio 
station without first securing a license from the Secretary of Commerce* but 
this specification was ruled unconstitutional. The Secretary of Commerce 
could only prescribe conditions under which licensees would operate with 
penalties for violation. Chaos ruled the airwaves until the passage of 
the Radio Act of 1927. The government still had not addressed itself 
to the issue of common carrier, but the term "wireless" was added to 
the Interstate Commerce Act. The problem was in deciding whether radio 
was similar enough to categorize it with the railway system and/or the 
telegraph and telephone industry.
The crux of the problem regarding radio being regulated as a common
carrier pointed to the physical nature of the medium:
In telephonic and telegraphic communication, while 
nothing visible and tangible is transported, the dif­
ficulty of conceiving that as commerce and subject to 
the power of Congress is aided by the necessity of 
wires and physical property in order to transmit the 
ideas and messages. But in radio the problem becomes 
more difficult because there is no material connec­
tion between the states, not even air waves, merely 
the indefinable ether waves permeating everywhere.^7
46
Frank J. Kahn, ed., Documents in American Broadcasting (New York: 
Appleton-Century-Crofts, 1968), p. 7.
47Carberry F. O'Shea, "Radio--Federal Jurisdiction & Regulatory 
Power Over Radio Communication,11 Georgetown Law Journal, Vol. XVII,
1929, p. 340.
It was well established that the communication of intelligence between
countries or states was the subject of governmental regulation under
48
the Commerce Clause. Furthermore sending messages across state lines
was considered interstate commerce. It seemed inevitable that radio
would be included within this framework since its application to com-
49munication by telephone and telegraph had already been determined.
Scholars debated the issue and two sides formed; those who felt
radio broadcasting should be a common carrier and those who felt it
should not. Advocates of the former position felt that "by taking
control of radio communication Congress has power to fix rates for
individual messages and for broadcasting. It can provide for censor-
50ship, and probably complete supervision of programs." Proponents of 
the latter view agreed that there were points of similarity between 
radio and the universally established common carrier, a railway;* how­
ever, the similarity between the broadcasting station and the railway 
company ceases at a certain point.
The railroad, and carriers of a similar nature, can best 
serve the public interest by lending their facilities to 
all who wish to employ them. Legislation forcing upon 
broadcasting stations any such duty, however, would seem 
most unwise and undesirable. The first duty of a broad-
48
Pensacola Telegraph Co. v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 96 U.S., 
1878, p. 9.
49Western Union Telegraph Co. v. William Pendleton, 122 U.S.,
1886, p. 347.
50
O ’Shea, "Federal Jurisdiction and Regulatory Powers," p. 345.
*Both render their service for hire with the consumer or listener 
ultimately paying the cost, and as agencies of commerce are public em­
ployees and servants. \
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casting station should be the furnishing of programs 
which will serve the interest, convenience, and neces­
sity of the listening public, not the broadcaster.51
AT&T Experiments With Common Carrier 
Radio Operations
Even though there was no legislative action passed in regards to
the applicability of the common carrier doctrine to radio broadcasting,
common carrier operations, under the name "toll broadcasting," were
conducted for a time in the early 1920's by a New York radio station
52owned by American Telephone and Telegraph. AT&T was hesitant about 
the new7 radio medium for obvious economic reasons. Two factions devel­
oped between those who wanted the company to venture into radio and 
those who saw the company's economic future best fulfilled by dissem­
inating entertainment through telephone wires. Two events seemed to 
trigger AT&T's "public radiotelephone broadcasting" as they first termed 
it (later to call it "toll broadcasting"). First came the debut of KDKA 
which obliterated the concept of sending information/entertainment over 
telephone wires. The second "event" was AT&T's continued hesitancy to 
become involved in the radio industry because of its lack of receivers 
to sell. As a result, it seems, the company combined the ideas of both 
factions, when on January 12, 1922, it disclosed its concept of "toll 
broadcasting":
We, the telephone company, were to provide no programs.
The public was to come in. Anyone who had a message
51
Fricks, "Radio Broadcasting as a Common Carrier," p. 175.
52
Erick Barnouw, A Tower in Babel (New York: Oxford University
Press, 1966), p. 106.
for the world or wished to entertain was to come in 
and pay their money as they would upon coming into a 
telephone booth, address the world, and go out.53
Although ’'toll broadcasting" carried with it none of the terms 
usually associated with the common carrier doctrine, the basic concept 
of "holding oneself out for hire" was present. Furthermore, AT&T en­
visioned a network of thirty-eight stations that would operate on a 
"toll" basis. The plan was made public and contained tones of common 
carrier concept:
The American Telephone and Telegraph Company will provide 
no program of its own, but provide the channels through 
which anyone with whom it makes a contract can send out 
their own programs.^
The dream became a reality on July 25, 1922 as WBAY, the first radio
55telephone toll station, broadcast its first program. Unfortunately, 
the tall buildings in New York Citj' were absorbing the station’s 
signal and as a result, the station could barely be heard. Not all 
was lost as a transmitter placed in a different part of the city was 
able to broadcast a strong signal. This transmitter was given the 
call letters WEAF and became the pioneer toll broadcasting station. 
AT&T had claimed there were many requests for its public broadcast 
service, but in spite of these it was over a month before toll broad­
casting found a single customer! An economic battle was being waged
53Ibid.
54
William P. Banning, Commercial Broadcasting Pioneer: The WEAF
Experiment 1922-26 (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1946), p7""68.
55
Barnouw, A Tower in Babel, p. 108.
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during WEAF’s debut between those who thought the only way to support 
radio broadcasting was by advertising and by others who viewed any form of 
commercialism as distasteful. Due to the lack of interest in AT&T’s 
"toll broadcasting" and their need for revenues to support their pro­
gramming, * radio broadcasting as a common carrier was short-lived.
The FCC Does Not Recognize Radio 
to be a Common Carrier
It was not until the passage of the Communications Act of 1934 that
the newly-established Federal Communications Commission addressed it­
self to the issue of common carrier as it applied to radio broadcasting. 
They stated in that document:
Any person engaged as a common carrier for hire, in 
interstate or foreign communication by wire or radio 
or in interstate or foreign radio transmission of 
energy, except where reference is made to common car­
riers not subject to this Act; but a person engaged in 
radio broadcasting shall not, insofar as such person 
is so engaged, be deemed a common carrier.56
The reasoning behind the FCC's ruling not to consider radio broadcasting
as a common carrier was that due to the physical limitations of the radio
spectrum, not every person or group could make use of its facilities.
One of the tenets of the common carrier doctrine is that a carrier must
undertake to serve all who apply for its services. In the case of radio
this would be physically impossible.
*AT&T had at first been determined not to produce programs. It 
wanted no more responsibility over content than it had in the case of 
phone calls. (Barnouw, p. 109). Lack of control over content has, 
since the development of CATV, become a basic principle of the common 
carrier doctrine.
Title I, Section 3 (h) of the Communications Act of 1934 as amended.
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From a regulatory standpoint the advent of television in the late 
1940's and early 1950's posed no new problems concerning the common 
carrier doctrine. The channel scarcity argument was directly applicable 
to television and hence it too was deemed not to be a common carrier 
when the Communications Act of 1934 was amended to include television 
broadcasting.
Broadcasting altered the common carrier doctrine by raising the 
channel scarcity issue. It had been a main point of the common carrier 
doctrine that a carrier should serve all those who undertake its ser­
vices, But the question had not been raised, what happens if there is 
a limited supply? Road and water carriers handled excess demand by 
increasing their load capacity. The telephone companies developed 
larger trunk lines to prevent circuit overloads. But the electro­
magnetic spectrum is limited; only a certain number of channels are 
available. Prior to this time the common carrier doctrine had under­
gone changes of an economic nature (liability, rate regulation); 
broadcasting brought changes in the doctrine of a physical or techno­
logical nature. As the following chapters will reveal, cable television 
poses further questions regarding liability, rate regulation and 
technology.
CHAPTER II
CABLE TECHNOLOGY
Broadcast technology restricts a television station to only one 
channel, but broadband technology allows a cable company to have a 
still undetermined maximum number of channels. Few existing systems 
actually operate more than 12 channels but forty or fifty channel 
systems are technologically feasible.^ Cable television makes it 
possible to shift communications from an economy of ’'scarcity" to 
one of abundance. The advocates of public access to CATV point to the 
unlimited availability of cable channels. But from a technological 
standpoint there are some problems inherent in multi-channel cable 
systems. Some of these problems may be such that only expensive 
electronic equipment (much of it not yet developed) can correct the 
situation. Cable service is usually purchased to improve reception, 
but television picture quality is limited intrinsically by the channel 
bandwidth and by the poor reception characteristics of most television 
sets.^
^Michael Botein, "Access to Cable Television," Cornell Law Review, 
Vol. 57, 1972, p. 424.
^Walter S. Baer, Cable Television; A Handbook for Decision­
making (Rand Corp. Memo. R-1133-NSF), p. 38.
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The Physical Limitations of the Electromagnetic Spectrum
The single most significant characteristic of over-the-air tele­
vision broadcasting is that it makes use of the electromagnetic or 
radio spectrum. (See Table IE) Electromagnetic waves, produced by the 
acceleration or oscillation of an electric charge, radiate outwards 
from the source at the speed of light, 300 million meters per second. 
These waves have a frequency, expressed in cycles per second (or
Hertz), and a wavelength, generally expressed in units of the metric
3 4system. The following diagram will illustrate this:
Time
"A" complete cycle and includes a movement from "0" 
to "B", back past "0" to "A" and back again to "0."
Frequency depicts numbers of cycles of movement com­
pleted in a specific time period.
Wavelength is illustrated by "D."
3Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,’
P *. 7.
^Sydney W. Head, Broadcasting in America (New York: Houghton
Mifflin Co., 1972), p. 27.
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The electromagnetic spectrum can be made analogous to a super 
highway, over which the produce of communication is carried to and from 
a market. AM radio, television broadcasting, mobile radio, microwave 
and even visible light, are electromagnetic waves that can exist simul­
taneously and distinctively in the space around us. The distinction is 
that they occupy different portions of the electromagnetic spectrum.
Each signal rides on a different lane of the highway, identified by its
5
frequency (the number of oscillations per second of its carrier wave).
The radiation of waves through space is referred to as propagation. 
Physical laws govern the characteristics of propagation. A simple anal­
ogy could be illustrated by dropping a pebble into a lake. The waves 
radiate from the source equally in all directions, forming a cir­
cular pattern. As the waves become distributed over a larger and 
larger area of water, the ripples become smaller and smaller. A 
similar effect occurs with radio energy, which radiates from a trans­
mitter into space equally in all directions, also forming a circular 
pattern. As the energy becomes widely distributed, it in turn becomes 
thinly dispersed. That is, after a certain distance, the signal becomes 
so weak it is undistinguishable. This effect is known as "attenuation" 
and as this study will reveal is a serious problem in cable communi­
cations.^ Other physical properties affect radio energy such as
5
Hubert J. Schlafly, "The Real World of Technological Evolution in 
Broadband Communications," (A Report prepared for the Sloan Commission), 
1972, p. 2.
Head, Broadcasting in America, p. 35.
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atmospheric conditions, physical obstacles (such as tall buildings) or
ionized areas. Also if two signals occupy the same frequency at the
same geographical location there will be "interference" between these
two signals. These restrictions limit the number of frequencies that
can be assigned to a particular service in a particular location. The
chief problem of spectrum allocation is using each frequency range to
its best advantage by capitalizing on its strong points and avoiding
degradation of service because of its weak points.^
There is a means, however, of using the same frequency 
simultaneously in the same location. Do not allow the 
signal to radiate. Keep it confined so that it reaches 
the receiver terminals over a shielded and a controlled 
path. Protect the signal from interference with or by 
radiated signals which saturate the air.*^
Coaxial Cable Provides Unlimited Signal Carrying Capacity
The use of physical wires affords the opportunity of protecting a
broadcast signal. The "magic" of cable technology is the coaxial
cable, a wire suitable to high frequency transmissions. Such cables
are used to transmit electrical signals from zero frequency (direct
current) all the way up to several thousand million cycles per second.
The tremendous signal carrying capacity of the co­
axial cable was vividly portrayed by FCC Commissioner 
Nicholas Johnson when he stated that comparing the 
cable to the telephone wire was like comparing 
"Niagara Falls to a garden hose."^
7
Ibid., p. 38.
g
Schlafly, "Broadband Communication," p. 2.
9
Robert L. Steiner, Visions of Cable-Vision (A Report of the 
Stephen H. Wilder Foundation), 1972, p. 197
The coaxial cable is a wire with a small diameter inner conductor 
positioned at the center of a larger diameter outer conductor. Most 
cables have a tough outer jacket of polyethylene for environmental 
protection. The four sizes of coaxial cable generally used are 3/4- 
inch, 1/2-inch,' 27/64-inch and approximately 1/4-inch diameter.
The following picture will illustrate this:
^Copper sheath (outer 
conductor)
Plastic form sealant 
Copper wire (inner 
conductor)
Plastic jacket
Headend Processes Television Signals for Distribution 
Over Trunk Lines to CATV Subscribers
A conventional cable system distributes signals from a headend to 
many subscribers. The illustration in Table HI will illustrate this. 
The major components of a cable system are the antennas and headend 
facilities, the cable distribution system and the subscriber equipment.
A cable system places its receiving antennas on the highest usable 
ground whereby it picks up signals directly off-the-air from television 
stations from a maximum distance of 100 miles. Those at a greater dis­
tance are received through a network of microwave links. Microwave
^Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 11.
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links can be repeated if necessary depending on the terrain and the
distance. The final receiver, at a cable headend, must demodulate the
video and sound and then modulate these program signals in the form
suitable for a conventional home television receiver. It is at this
point that most of the degradation of cable signals occur due to the
repeated modulation/demodulation processes. Such problems will con-
11
tinue until better techniques or equipments are engineered.
A separate antenna is generally used for each broadcast station,
so it can be tuned to the station's frequency and mechanically aligned
to receive the strongest and clearest signal. Coaxial cables deliver
these signals to the headend, usually located in a small building near
the antenna site. The headend processes the television signals for
12distribution on the cable system. This process includes:
a) amplifying each signal to sufficient strength for dis­
tribution.
b) filtering out unwanted signals.
c) "translating” or changing the frequency of some channels 
so they can be sent over the cable.
d) "demodulating" or extracting the TV information from 
signals imported by microwave to the community.
e) "modulating” these imported signals and any video sig­
nals that originate with the cable system; that is, 
providing them with a carrier frequency to match a stan­
dard VHF channel. This must be done for all local 
cablecasting, access programming, automated services 
and any other locally generated signals.
f) mixing all the signals into one composite signal for 
distribution over the cable.
11Ibid., p. 7.
12Baer, Handbook for Decisionmaking, p. 15.
Attenuation and Amplifier Limitations Pose 
Serious CATV Reception Problems
Television signals lose strength, similar to radio energy, as they 
travel through the cable, an effect known as "line loss" (attenuation). 
All electrical signals suffer some line loss. This loss is greater for 
higher frequencies. For instance, a 300 MHz signal will undergo the 
same percentage of loss in a 200-foot cable that a 50 MHz signal under­
goes in 500 feet. The 50 MHz signal can proceed through 2.5 times as 
much cable length as the 300 MHz signal before requiring amplification. 
Line loss in a system at Channel 13 is more than double the loss at 
Channel 2. Attenuation also increases with rising temperatures. 
Seasonal changes generally require manual system rebalancing by an 
operators maintenance crew, even though special compensating circuits 
have been installed. Several devices are used to decrease attenuation. 
For instance, larger cables have less line loss. • Consequently, 1/2- 
inch or 3/4-inch cables are used for trunk lines, the backbone of the 
distribution system. Trunk lines, strung on utility poles or in
underground ducts, distribute television signals from the headend
14throughout the geographic area served. A great deal of line loss 
could occur but another compensating device is used-ramplifiers. 
Particular care goes into designing trunk amplifiers because the 
delivered picture quality depends heavily on them, perhaps more than
13Steiner, Visions of Cable-Vision, p. 20.
14
Carl Pilnick, Cable Television: Technical Considerations in
Franchising Major Market Systems (Rand Corp. Memo. R-1137-NSF),
April 1973, p. 23.
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15any other single component. The problem of limiting attenuation is 
critically important especially in light of CATV’s proposed multi­
channel capacities. These amplifiers, installed along the trunk line, 
serve to boost the signal strength back to usable levels. Using 
larger-diameter cables reduces attenuation losses, so that amplifiers 
can be spaced farther apart. The cable cost increases, therefore,
while the amplifier cost per mile decreases. Conversely, a smaller
16
cable means lower cable cost but higher amplifier cost.
The primary importance of amplifiers, though, is that CATV's
systems' channel capacity is principally set by cable amplifiers. This
17channel capacity is technically limited! This becomes critically 
important in light of cable's proposed multi-channel capacities. The 
advocates of common carrier access base many of their arguments on the 
abundant availability of cable television channels. Current amplifiers 
are limited to a usable bandwidth of about 300 MHz. While this theo­
retically is equivalent to 50 television channels, interference among
channels gives a practical limit of about 25 to 35 channels for each 
18
cable. The 25 to 35 channel range represents an upper limit.
Engineers find it hard to agree on a precise channel limit, 
since it depends on the signal quality one is willing to 
accept, the particular amplifier and cable system design?
15
1 Ibid.
Ibid.
^Baer, Handbook for Decisionmaking, p. 19.
18 , .
Ibid.
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and environmental factors such as the temperature changes 
the amplifier is subject to. ^-9
Interference is a major disadvantage of cable amplifiers. This is
due to the cascading effect of noise and distortion produced by a string
20
of amplifiers. The following diagram will clarify this:
^Ibid., ftnt. 2.
20
Pilnick, Technical Considerations in Franchising, p. 24.
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The portion of noise to signal increases with each amplifier in a given 
"string." The desired signal starts through the cable with a magnitude 
of X, which reduces to Y at some point down the line because of attenu­
ation. The first amplifier .boosts the signal back up to X again and 
the process is repeated with each successive amplifier. The same thing 
happens with noise content that starts at level A and falls to B. At 
each amplifier location, however, the amplifier not only brings the 
noise level back up again, but also generates additional noise and adds 
it to the previous level. Thus, the noise at A-l is a higher percentage 
of the signal level X than it was at A. This cumulative process finally 
results in a noise level that can visibly degrade the picture, usually 
in the form of "snow." Thus, the number of trunk amplifiers that can be 
cascaded in one continuous cable run is limited.
The specific limit on the number of amplifiers that 
can be cascaded will depend on amplifier character­
istics, cable size, expected temperature variations 
and other factors. Typical limits, however, range 
from 20 to 30 cascaded amplifiers with spacing between 
amplifiers of 1500 to 3000 feet. This means there is 
a practical limit to the length of a single trunk cable, 
which can range perhaps from 5 to 10 miles for conven­
tional trunk cable.21.
Broadcast Equipment Now Available May Not 
Alleviate CATV Reception Problems
Most of the undesired effects that occur in a cable system can be 
attributed to the limitations and noise distortions of amplifiers. But 
other cable hardware can cause poor picture quality. These include: 
a) bridging amplifiers, which isolate trunk line from subscribers
Ibid., p. 23.
37
connections; b) feeder cable, cable used to distribute signals from the
trunk line to the point where each subscriber’s individual drop-line
connection is tapped-off; c) taps, connecting wires used to couple drop
cables and feeder cables;and d) drop cable, small length of cable used
22
to bring the TV signal directly into subscribers' homes. The main
disadvantage of this line equipment is that manufacturers did not intend
the effective range of operation of these devices to go beyond the
23limits of their intended use. Many of these devices installed to
date have poor performance records. In light of the minimum channel
capacity requirements set forth in the February, 1972, Cable Television
Report and Order, many of these items will have to be replaced when
CATV operators expand and up-grade their service. Although the cost of
these items is modest the quantity is large and the installation labor
24input is substantial. Contrary to FCG intentions, this may pose an 
economic burden to some systems.
The design problem for today's CATV system is complex, confusing
and subject to circumstances beyond the control of many cable operators.
Good broadcast reception of a large number of channels 
requires skill and luck. Even with the best equipment,
tower location and propagation paths, so-called studio
quality is an impossible dream. There are many vari­
ables over which the cable operator has no control-- 
the program content; the technical excellence of the 
program source (AT&T long lines, film, tape or the 
broadcast studio camera); the performance of the trans­
mitter; the transmitter power; the propagation 
distance; weather; and some multi-patch situations.
22Ibid., p. 25.
23Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 15.
24
Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg., 1972, p. 3269.
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Surprisingly often the cable operator receives the 
blame for those factors.^
Headend processing equipment and selection performance and maintenance 
is the total responsibility of the CATV operator. Yet these functions 
are directed by what is available on the market, how well equipment 
meets its performance specifications and perhaps, most important, the 
economics of the CATV system.
These problems will not be alleviated when cable systems expand to 
meet the 1972 FCC requirements. The number of channels being carried 
in a broad-band system is a determining factor in the magnitude of dis­
tortion. New amplifier designs are being tested but many are too costly 
to market. "The fact that so little demonstratable results can be shown
is due more to the inherently slow and painful way in which professionals
26
make progress in controversial and strange technical areas."
On-Channel Interference Limits Channel 
Capacity in Major Markets
Before examining the different methods that have been proposed for 
cable systems offering a capacity of more than twelve channels, one problem 
should be noted that afflicts cable systems with both less and more than 
12 channels.
The 12 channel VHF dial has become the standard channel-selection 
device for all cable system transmissions compatible with broadcast TV
25Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 21. 
26Ibid., p. 24.
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standards.* In the early days of cable, systems were usually built in 
rural areas and the cable operator transmitted the television signal to 
each subscriber on the same channel (carrier frequency) as it was broad­
cast. For example, if the cable company picked up Channel 5 off-the- 
air, it was delivered as Channel 5. But as cable expanded into more 
densely populated metropolitan areas, the radiated signal strength from 
local television stations was strong. Suppose a cable system picks up 
Channel 5 off-the-air and delivers it to each subscriber, now, however, 
each subscriber's receiver can also pick up some of Channel 5's signal 
from the radiated broadcast. The subscriber's receiver is carrying two 
television signals, one delivered through the cable and one pick-up off- 
the-air. Unfortunately, these arrive at slightly different times since 
the propagation velocity through the coaxial cable is less than in air.**
As a result, the signal delay causes a "ghost image" which can be very 
?7
distracting* This effect is particularly acute in New York City due
to the tall skyscrapers. "Ghosting" becomes particularly troublesome to
28the subscriber in the case of color television. Better methods of
*
Television receivers since 1964 also include UHF tuners for Chan­
nels 14 to 84. But UHF frequencies (470 to 890 MHz) are too high for 
present U.S. cable systems to carry directly.
This is true even with the receiver antenna disconnected, since 
a few inches of unshielded wire will pick up the signal in sufficient 
strength to allow it to proceed through the receiver.
27Pilnick, Technical Considerations in Franchising, p. 12.
28
Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,
p. 172.
40
shielding the TV receiver could reduce some of this off-the-air pickup,
but it does not represent an effective solution since it would add a
new element of cost to receivers. This plan has been rejected by set
manufacturers.
The magnitude of the problem becomes critical for the 
major market.areas. In Los Angeles, for example, 
there are seven assigned VHF stations: Channels 2, 4, 5,
7,9, 11 and 13. A cable system in the Los Angeles 
region might well encounter on-channel interference 
for all seven, which would mean, in effect, that they 
could not be cabled directly to subscribers at their 
broadcast frequencies. The FCC requires, however, 
that all local TV broadcasts be provided to cable
subscribers.29
A common solution to this problem has been to translate the carrier fre­
quency of each channel that is subject to direct interference to a fre­
quency unused in that local area. For instance, local Channel 3 would 
be translated to Channel 4 because if Channel 3 were an assigned channel 
in the local area, Channel 4 would not be. Although this solution works 
in some cases, it is impossible in large cities such as Los Angeles, 
since the channel of the strong signal is left unoccupied on the cable.
If this were done for all seven channels in Los Angeles there would only be
30five unused positions left on the television tuner dial. Thus, CATV sys­
tems that do not utilize converters at the subscriber’s location are 
limited to less than the available twelve channels by the direct pickup 
interference problem. In large metropolitan areas, a 12-channel system 
can easily reduce itself to a .5-7 channel system.
Pilnick, Technical Considerations in Franchising, p. 13. 
Ibid.
Three Proposals to Increase CATV Systems 
to 24"Channel Capacity
The critical point of this technical discussion is that this situ­
ation would be even further aggravated by the FCC’s requirement for 
CATV’s expansion to include cablecasting, government, education and 
access channels which could not directly use the seven positions where 
strong off-the-air pickup existed. It should be obvious, then, that a 
cable operator in the top 100 markets in order to comply with the FCC's 
20-channel minimum must design a new cable system. . There are three 
principal choices:
1. Multiple (or Dual Cable Systems: an existing 12-
channel system could be-enlarged to a 24-channel 
system by installing a completely duplicate plant 
which carries the same 12 channels but with dif­
ferent program material. The only requirement in 
addition to present equipment would be a cable 
selector switch at the subscriber's set so that
he could choose channels on cable A or cable B. 31-
Simplicity is the principal advantage to this approach. It eliminates
converters and other problem electronic components, and thus makes the
system more reliable. It also offers attractive advantages for two-way
transmission. A disadvantage is cost. Dual cable systems are obviously
more expensive than single cable systems--not twice as much, since the
added installation costs are small, but about 50 percent more. A serious
disadvantage is that a dual system does not eliminate the problem of on-
channel interference. For example, a community with four strong over-
the air broadcast stations will only have sixteen usable channels which
does not satisfy the FCC requirements.
Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 26.
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2, Converters: a converter changes a nonstandard
frequency channel to a VHF channel that can be 
tuned directly on the subscriber's TV set. In 
short, the converter replaces the standard TV 
set tuner and provides more channel positions.
The extra channels in a converter system are 
carried on the cable at frequencies between 
Channel 6 and Channel 7 (known as the mid-band) 
and above Channel 13 (known as the super-band).
See Table 1. The industry today designates nine 
mid-band channels and thirteen super-baiid chan­
nels below 300 MHz. The converter changes the 
frequency of a selected channel to a standard 
VHF channel frequency that is unused for broad­
casting in the community. The TV set tuner is 
set permanently to that channel, and all selec­
tion is performed at the converter. The conver­
ter thus completely eliminates on-channel 
interference, since its output will never be at 
the same frequency as a strong local station.32
The main advantage of this system, of course, is the elimination of on- 
channel interference. But, converters introduce other interference and 
picture-degradation difficulties. Many converters respond inadequately 
to variations in signal strength and are overloaded by strong input sig­
nals. This causes picture distortion. The converter oscillator, a com­
ponent necessary for frequency conversion, can drift with temperature 
and time. Channel selectivity--the ability to distinguish sharply 
between adjacent channels--is sometimes poor. And because more frequen­
cies are carried on the cable, more interference problems among channels 
arise. These problems are due more to an emphasis on low cost in con­
verter design than to technical limitations. Converters range in price 
from $35 to $50 in small quantities to $25 to $30 in lots of 1000. Since 
a converter is needed for each TV set, a $25 unit cost may represent 15 
to 20 percent of total System capital investment. Consequently, the
32
Ibid.
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pressures for low-cost converter design are great. Initial cost savings
may be outweighed in a few years by added service calls and subscribers'
complaints. Another disadvantage might be the limitations of mid-band
and super-band channels. There is doubt whether all channels can be
33used due to unfavorable beat and harmonic combinations.
3. Switched Systems: all of the several varieties of
switched systems bring signals from the headend to 
a switching center that serves from twenty to several 
hundred subscribers. Two separate wires or cables run 
from the switching center to each subscriber receiver.
One wire carries subscriber requests to the switching 
center, and the other returns the selected television 
signal.34
Switched systems are simple in concept and may have advantages for cer­
tain applications, but they demand complex wiring and numerous switching 
centers. In crowded urban areas, the cost of switching centers may be 
high and the cost of laying the necessary wiring underground may be pro­
hibitive.
There is not a "best solution" to the channel expansion problem. 
Systems with multiple cables eliminate converters, but do not prevent 
direct interference. Converters solve the direct interference problem 
completely, but introduce new possibilities for interference and picture 
degradation. Switched systems eliminate both the direct interference 
and the converter problems, but seem too cumbersome and expensive for 
major market operations.
The intent of this chapter has not been to unveil all the problems 
of cable television hardware but rather to point out the areas of
oo
This section relies heavily on Baer, Handbook for Decisionmaking, 
pp. 19-24.
Q  /
Schlafly, "Broadband Communications," p. 26.
technological uncertainty and the risks involved in future system expan­
sion. Technological concerns become critically important in common 
carrier operations as the availability of multiple channels is the basis 
for common carrier access.
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CHAPTER III
CATV: REGULATORY DILEMMA
In four decades of regulating single-channel broadcasting, the 
Federal Communications Commission has adopted a number of methods to 
encourage program diversity. For instance, a potential licensee has 
to prove it ■will provide better service than any competing applicant; 
comparative hearings are required to consider petitions opposing re­
newal of a station's license; the Commission's "Fairness Doctrine" 
requires that broadcasters give reply time for controversial issues; 
the "duopoly rule" limits the number of broadcasting stations one 
individual or corporation may own and finally, the "Blue Book" sets 
forth general program guidelines. But spectrum space in the very- 
high-frequency (VHF) band is sufficient to provide only a few tele­
vision channels— typically two to four--in most major cities. This 
posed a constraint in view of the FCC's policy of promoting program 
diversity.
The Commission became strongly persuaded in the 
early 1950's that the development of broadcasting 
in the ultra-high-frequency (UHF) portion of the 
frequency band, in addition to VHF, was the most 
promising approach to relieving the problem. Al­
though the number of channels in major markets 
using both VHF and UHF would remain restricted, 
typically ranging from five to seven, this would 
still be a significant improvement over broadcasting 
without UHF.1
Leland L. Johnson, Cable Television and the Question of Protecting 
Local Broadcasting (Rand Corp. Memo. R-595-MF), October, 1970, p. 1,
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However, the growth of UHF has been slower and less profitable than had 
been hoped, VKF and UHF have significantly different technical and 
economic characteristics* The technical differences are less signifi­
cant than the economic differences, but, even from a technical view­
point, UHF channel assignments are less advantageous than VHF channel 
assignments, because more power and antenna height are required for
UHFs to obtain the same area coverage as VHFs* UHF signals are also
2
more vulnerable to obstacles such as rough terrain* But the root of
the problem goes back to the beginning of television operations* VHF
channels were the first ones licensed and they tended to dominate the
major markets.
• * * • most of the popular programming was on Channels 
2 through 13, there was little consumer interest in 
television receivers capable of receiving UHF channels.
In the absence of such receivers, UHF broadcasters were 
unable to interest advertisers in their programming; and 
as a consequence, they lacked the financial means to 
underwrite popular mass audience programming.3
This is the atmosphere in which cable television emerged. The po­
tential of cable for bringing many additional channels into metropolitan 
areas, and the potential conflicts with over-the-air broadcasting, was
hardly perceived. At that time, most observers had never heard of cable
4television, much less had perceived its long-term potential. Although 
the FCC*s attempts at activating the UHF channels came during CATV's in­
fancy, the consequences of its decision had a powerful effect on the 
regulatory development of cable television. This effect resulted in
2
Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,
p. 12.
3Ibid.. p. 13.
4
Johnson, Protecting Local Broadcasting, p. 1.
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restrictive policies that were to govern the industry for nearly ten 
years.
The slow and halting progress toward achievement of 
the goals set for UHF and the potential of CATV as 
an additional rather than an auxiliary broadcast 
service have left the FCC with a national communi­
cation policy that seems at odds with economic and 
technical reality.^ »
The Commission's insistence that CATV cannot be allowed to destroy UHF
\ .
and its further insistence that local broadcasters be protected have been
£
major reasons for the FCC's restrictive policies. This attitude 
apparently has had some bearing on the Commission's failure to "act 
on the very important issue of common carrier access to CATV--a problem 
which the Commission consistently delights in raising and then never 
resolving." The multi-channel capacity inherent in common carrier 
access might, due to audience fragmentation, pose an economic hardship 
for local broadcasters.
' V
FCC Rejects Legal Application of Common Carrier Doctrine 
to CATV in Frontier Case
In light of this illustration it is interesting to note that the 
FCC's first formal assessment of cable television dealt with the economic 
impact of such systems on local broadcasters. It is rather coincidental, 
too, that this assessment dealt with the common carrier issue. On
5Charles 0. Verrill, Jr., "CATV's Emerging Role: Cablecaster or
Common Carrier?" Law and Contemporary Problems, Vol. 34, 1969, p. 590.
^Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C. 2d., 
1965, p. 469.
7
Michael Botein, "CATV Regulation: A Jumble of Jurisdictions,"
New York University Law Review, Voli 45, 1970, p. 839.
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April 2, 1958, the Commission denied a petition by a group of television
and radio broadcasters that it assert jurisdiction over CATV as a common 
8carrier. Frontier Broadcasting Co. claimed that CATV systems were com­
mon carriers and requested the Commission to authorize CATV systems as 
communication common carriers and "to establish a basis upon which
reasonable charges, practices, classifications and regulations can be 
9
determined." Frontier Broadcasting Co. contended that CATV systems
were engaged in "wire communication" within the meaning of Section 3 (a)
of the Communications Act* and:
• . . that they will serve any member of the public
who undertakes to pay the applicable charges and to
whom the service can feasibly be provided; that the 
systems' undertaking is to transmit signals originating 
with broadcast stations to the system's subscriber 
and that the operations of the systems are in inter­
state commerce. They conclude, therefore, that CATV 
systems are common carriers engaged in interstate 
commerce thus subject to provisions of the Communi­
cations Act relating to common carriers.10
The defendant, Laramie Community TV Co., denied it was a common
carrier because they merely engaged in providing a physical facility,
such as many apartment houses and motels provide, whereby people may
obtain clearer television reception. Their main argument stated that
they were not a common carrier in the ordinary sense because the
8Frontier Broadcasting Co., 24 F.C.C., 1958, p. 251.
9
Ibid.
"k
Wire communication defined as transmission of writing, signs, sig­
nals, pictures, and sounds of all kinds by aid of wire, cable, or other 
like connection between points of origin and reception of such trans­
mission, including all instrumentalities, facilities, apparatus, and 
services incidental to such transmission.
10Ibid., p. 252.
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customer has no voice in what programs/information is to be received
other than his option to turn off the set.^ Upon consideration of
the arguments presented the Commission handed down a landmark decision
saying in parts
Even though the operation of a CATV system may have 
several attributes in common with the operation of a 
communications common carrier, particularly to the 
extent that there is an offer to transmit by wire, 
intelligence in the form of television broadcast 
signals to any member of the public who desires to 
subscribe to the service, there appears to be at 
least one significant difference. This difference 
lies in the fact that the specific signals received 
and distributed by the CATV system are, of necessity, 
determined by the CATV system and not the subscriber.
No individual subscriber has the option nor may he 
compel the CATV system to receive and deliver a par­
ticular signal at a given time; nor has he the option 
or right to compel the station to receive and deliver 
signals different from, or in addition to, those 
offered or selected by the CATV system . . . .  These 
considerations appear to militate against a conclusion 
that CATV systems are engaged in a common carrier
undertaking.12
The Frontier case did little to alter the common carrier doctrine per se
yet it served as a kind of stumbling block, making the Commission quite
chary about the common carrier subject. So much, in fact, it was not until
nearly a decade later that any action was taken to resolve the
issue. The Frontier decision has been reaffirmed in two subsequent
13cases. In Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co., v. FCC, the court 
held that the position taken by the FCC that regulating CATV as 
adjuncts of the nation's broadcasting system was a "more appropriate
11Ibid., p. 253.
12Ibid., p. 254.1 DIG • 9 « 4 •
^ Philadelphia Television Broadcasting Co. v. F.C.E., 359 F. 2d., 
(D.C. Cir), 1966, p. 282. — -
avenue for Commission action than wide range of regulation implicit in
common carrier t r e a t m e n t . I n  United States, v. Southwestern Cable 
15Co., a case whose scope had far-reaching effects in the industry, the 
court said that although the FCC found that CATV was related to inter­
state transmission cable systems were neither common carriers nor 
broadcasters. Therefore, CATV did not apply to any of the principal 
regulatory categories created by the Communications Act.
FCC Refuses to Assume Jurisdiction Over CATV 
In 1959 Notice of Inquiry
The history of FCC regulation of cable television is complex and 
confusing. During the time the Frontier case was being heard, the FCC 
requested authority from Congress to regulate CATV but no legislation 
was enacted. After its initial refusal to assert jurisdiction, the FCC, 
in obvious response to CATV's threat to over-the-air broadcasting, has 
come full circle. This study does not intend to examine the entire 
regulatory history of the Commission, rather only those rulings applica­
ble to the common carrier concept.
Shortly after the Frontier case the FCC issued A Notice of Inquiry -^ 
where it posed various questions concerning its power to regulate CATV 
systems. The Commission determined that it had no jurisdiction over
14Ibid.. p. 284.
15
United States v. Southwestern Cable Co., 392 U.S., 1968, p. 157; 
also U.S. Law Week, Vol. 36, 1968, p. 4553.
1626 F.C.C., 1959, pp. 403-417.
cable television as a common carrier and cited its decision in Frontier 
Broadcasting Co. It also dismissed the assertion that jurisdiction 
could be assumed under the power to control broadcasters, since CATV 
transmission to customers was entirely by wire, any radio links being 
only between the "head end" of the cable and the master antenna and 
never to subscribers.^ A major point of the Inquiry stated that a 
CATV system's use of common carrier microwave for long-range transmis­
sion of its signals was no basis for jurisdiction. A case being heard 
near the time the Inquiry was released also denied that the Commission
had "plenary power to regulate any and all enterprises which happen
18to be connected with one of the many aspects of coiranunica tions."
FCC Attempts to Regulate Cable Television 
Through Microwave Common Carriers
Shortly after the Inquiry the FCC handed down a decision that
19modified its position. It issued a "procedural rule" under which it 
could regulate those common carriers that had been licensed to serve 
CATV and that had been created for that purpose. By requiring those 
carriers desiring to expand to show that in the preceding licensing 
period at least 5 0 percent of their total service hours and 50 
percent of the channels over which they operated were used by customers 
not directly controlling or controlled by the applicant, the Commission
^^Ibid.,. p. 405.
18
CATV and TV Repeater Services, 26 F.C.C., (Docket 12443), 1959,
p. 429.
1947 C.F.R. Sec. 21.709 (1965); see also 1 F.C.C. 2d., 1965, 
p. 902. ,
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was ostensibly attempting to guarantee that only a common carrier ful­
filling a public need would utilize a frequency reserved to the public.
It was not until the Carter Mountain case that the Commission completely 
reversed its decision.
20In Carter Mountain, the FCC denied a license for the construction 
of a microwave transmission and relay network serving several CATV sys­
tems in Wyoming on the grounds that the proposed use of the facility 
would substantially impair the economic situation of a local television 
station. Carter Mountain represents the assumption by the FCC of control 
over CATV systems making use of common carrier microwave transmissions.
The practical effect of the "procedural rule" and Carter Mountain was a
move by the FCC to gain control over cable television through the com- 
21mon carriers. The Carter Mountain decision would, in time, provide 
the jurisdictional foundation for the First Report and Order of 1965.
FCC Issues 1965 Notice Followed by 1966 Second Report 
and Order Granting FCC Official Authority 
to Regulate CATV
On April 23, 1965, the FCC issued two documents simultaneously, its
22First Report and Order and a Notice of Inquiry and Notice of Proposed
20Carter Mountain Transmission Corp., 32 F.C.C., 1962, pp. 459-468; 
see also Carter Mountain Transmission Corp. v. FCC, 321 F. 2d., (D.C. 
Cir.), 1963', pp. 353-369. ~
^  , "The Wire Mire: The FCC and CATV," Harvard Law Review,
Vol. 79, 1965, p. 370.
22 In the matter of Amendment to Subpart I, Part 21, to Adopt Rules 
and Regulations to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Domestic 
Point to Point Microwave Radio Service for Microwave Radio Stations 
Used to Relay Television Signals to CATV; First Report and Order, 38 
F.C.C., 1965, pp. 683-690.
23Rule Making. The First Report and Order was basically a general appli­
cation of restrictions for all microwave-served CATV systems,, It was 
the Notice of Inquiry and not the First Report and Order that was impor­
tant, as the Notice asserted FCC jurisdiction over cable television but 
asked what form and to what degree this jurisdiction should be establish 
Secondly, the Notice imposed a freeze (that was nob lifted until the 
1972 Cable Television Report and Order) upon major market penetration 
while information could be gathered to determine the best way to regu­
late CATV.
Response to the Commission's invitation in the Notice of Inquiry,
for CATV operators and interested parties to file suggestions and
24comments set the stage for the 1966 Second Report and Order. For 
all practical purposes the Second Report and Order signified the FCC's 
official authority to regulate community antenna television.* Several 
restrictions were placed on the cable industry, two of which have direct 
bearing on this study:
23In the matter of Amendment of Part 24, 74 (Proposed Subpart J and 
9) to Adopt Rules Relating to the Distribution of Television Broadcast 
Signals by CATV, and Related Matters; Notice of Inquiry and Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, 1 F.C.C. 2d., 1965, pp. 453-467
24Amendment of Subpart L, Part 91, to Adopt Rules and Regulations 
to Govern the Grant of Authorization in the Business Radio Service for 
Microwave Stations to Relay Television Signals to Community Antenna Sys- 
temd (Second Report and Order), 2 F.C.C. 2d., 1966, pp. 725-801; see 
also: Edward Greenberg, 'Wire Television and the FCC's Second Report
and Order on CATV Systems," Journal of Law and Economics, Vol. - 10, 1967, 
pp. 181-203.
*CATV was to be regulated not because it was a common carrier, or 
because it rebroadcasts television services, or because it is a broad­
cast service, but rather because, in the FCC's judgment, it posed a 
threat--if unregulated--to "free television." (Verrill, "Cablecaster or 
Common Carrier," p. 593.)
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1. Compulsory carriage: a CATV system must carry the signals 
of local stations.
2. Major-market/distant-station policy: under this rule a CATV
system may not import into the 100 largest TV markets (em­
bracing metropolitan areas containing over 80 percent of the 
nation's population) unless it is given permission by the 
Commission, following a hearing which would determine whether 
CATV operations in a particular area "would be consistent with
the public interest, and particularly the establishment and
25healthy maintenance of UHF television broadcast service."
These two restrictions coupled with the Frontier decision alter the 
rationale that CATV is not a common carrier. In the Frontier case the 
FCC found a distinction between CATV and the traditional common carrier 
services in that the CATV operator had the final choice in selecting the 
signals to be carried over the system. The subscriber could only choose 
from the existing signals. The subsequent development of CATV regulation 
in the Second Report and Order has eliminated this distinction. The com­
pulsory carriage rule and major-market/distant-station policy has shifted 
the discretion as to which signals are to be carried over a cable sys­
tem from the CATV operator to the FCC. Thus far the FCC has failed to 
re-evaluate the 1958 Frontier decision and to project, on a long-term 
basis, whether the ultimate role of community antenna television should 
be a common carrier.
The legal rationale for the contrary conclusion no longer 
has merit since CATV clearly falls within not only the
25
Second Report and Order-1966, p. 782.
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statutory definition but also the Commission’s own 
articulation of principles establishing what is a 
common c a r r i e r . 26
Two years later on November 26, 1968 Commissioner Cox in Southern
27*
Bell Telephone and Telegraph Co.. ' indicated:
. . . .  at some time in the future the CATV industry 
may develop in such a way that we will have to con­
sider whether it should be subject to common carrier 
regulation. For the present, however, I think the 
actual conduct of the business of distributing tele­
vision ’signals by cable to subscribers for a monthly
fee is not a common carrier activity . . . .28
Commissioner Cox expressed doubt whether the FCC could force CATV opera­
tions to become common carriers since, "I see no way in which we could
require the various parties concerned to adjust their relationships so
29as to fit common carrier concepts." The Commissioner's statement was 
not published until 1969, just after the Commission reached the tentative 
conclusion, a turn-about in policy, that cable operators should operate
as common carriers on at least some channels. Commissioner Cox indicated
26Verrill, "Cablecaster or Common Carrier," p. 607.
27*
Southern Bell Telephone & Telegraph Co., 16 F.C.C. 2d., 1969, 
pp. 491-495 (concurring statement of Commissioner Kenneth A. Cox and 
dissent of Commissioner Nicholas Johnson). This case involved granting 
the application of So. Bell Tel. &. Tel. Co. for authority to construct 
and operate CATV channel facilities to serve a non-affiliated customer 
in Ga. In an earlier decision the Commission ruled that the furnishing 
by telephone companies of channels of communications to CATV operators 
is a common carrier undertaking. The FCC therefore required telephone 
companies to file tariffs covering the provision of such service. (Com­
mon Carrier Tariffs for CATV Systems, 4 F.C.C. 2d. 257 (1966), p. 260. 
The Commission also held in General Telephone Co. of California, 13 
F.C.C. 2d. 448 (1968) that the provision of channel service isan inter­
state common carriage service and that, therefore, telephone companies 
must obtain Section 214 authorization from the FCC before constructing 
facilities to provide this service. These two cases gave the FCC "in­
direct" jurisdiction over CATV.
n o
Ibid., p. 492.
29z Ibid.
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these common carrier operations would represent only a small part of the
ki • 30cable service.
December 12, 1968 Notice Encourages Cable 
Systems to Operate as Common Carriers
The Commission's proposal that the public interest would be served 
by encouraging CATV systems to operate as common carriers on some chan­
nels was contained in its Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and Notice of
31Inquiry released on December 12, 1968. The rationale behind its
decision was to:
. . .  provide an outlet for others to present programs 
of their own choosing, free from any control of the CATV 
operator as to content except as required by the Commis­
sion's rules or applicable law. It might also provide a 
low cost outlet for political candidates, possibly adver­
tisers, programs on a subscription basis, and various 
modestly funded organizations and entities in the commu­
nity who ma y be unable to afford time Cu or obtain access 
to broadcast facilities. And it might further provide a 
means for municipal authorities to fulfill any of their 
community needs that are not sufficiently met through 
CATV's obligation to act as a local outlet.32
The Proposed Rulemaking did not require CATV systems to operate as com­
mon carriers on some channel(s) but said the cable operator may if he
chose to do so. The Commission stated its intent to "return to this
33issue as the industry develops."
30Ibid.
31Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K of the Commission's Rules and 
Regulations Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems (Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking), Docket 18397, 15 F.C.C. 2d., 1968, pp. 417-504; 
see also Harold Barnett and Edward Greenberg, "A Proposal for Wired 
City Television," Washington University Law Quarterly, 1968, pp. 1-27.
32
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, December 12, 1968, p. 427.
33Ibid.. p. 421.
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A second major provision of the December 12th Notice was the Com­
mission's encouragement of cable operators to originate their own pro­
gramming* The FCC felt the public interest would be served by "increasing 
the number of local outlets for community self-expression and for
if 34augmenting the public's choice of programs and types of services.
This seemingly "harmless" proposal which was implemented in a First
3 5
Report and Order in Docket 18397 has been a major point of contention
in the present common carrier operations of CATV. The First Report and
Order in Docket 18397, released on October 24, 1969, established rules
regarding program origination and the standards cable systems would be
required to adhere to in their programming. Specifically, the rules
stated that on or after January 1, 1971, no CATV system having 3,500 or
more subscribers could carry the signals of any television station unless
the system also operated to a significant extent as a local outlet for
"cablecasting" (the term coined by the FCC to describe CATV program
origination.). This document not only marked the first move by the FCC
toward allowing CATV something more than a role supplementary to over-
the-air broadcasting, it necessitated the need to re-evaluate the role
of CATV systems. The Commission had for several years regarded CATV as
36
a business that distributed television signals. Then in its December 
12th Notice the FCC encouraged CATV systems to operate as common carriers 
but who would exercise no control over program content. Now cable
35
First Report and Order in Docket 18397, 20 F.C.C. 2d., 1969, 
pp. 201-236.
Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., p. 492.
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operators were being forced to originate their own programming. The 
Commission through its rulings, has combined the programming and trans­
mitting function of CATV. The conflict is an economic one. The cable 
operator has an interest in maximizing the audience for his own programs 
as against those of competing programmers using leased (common-carrier) 
channels. This conflict of interest is inherent in the cable operator’s
dual role as a programmer in his own right and a common carrier of pro-
37grams offered by others.
The Commission stated its rationale for requiring cablecasting and
encouraging some common carrier operations promoted the basic purpose
for which the Commission was created:
. . . regulating interstate and foreign commerce in com­
munication by wire and radio so as to make available, so 
far as possible, to all people of the United States a 
rapid, efficient, nationwide, and worldwide wire and radio 
communication service with adequate facilities at reason­
able charges. ^
This philosophy, perhaps more than any other, has served as the founda­
tion for the subsequent rulings whereby the Commission sought the de­
velopment of sufficient channel availability on all CATV systems. Although 
the Commission has yet to require that CATV systems operate as common 
carriers, their rulings that set forth channel capacity seem, a strong 
step.in that direction.
37Stephen R. Barnett, "State, Federal and Local Regulation of Cable 
Television," Notre Dame Lawyer, Vol. 47, 1972, p. 745.
OO
First Report and Order in Docket 18397, p. 201.
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1970 Second Further Notice Specifies 
Multi-Channel Requirements
On July 1, 1970, the FCC released two documents, Notice of Proposed
39
Rulemaking (Docket 18894) and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rule-
40making (Docket 18397-A). The former document served to notify cable
operators that the Commission intended to continue to require "minimum
system capacities adequate to serve foreseeable demand, and thus caution
operators to avoid the economic burden of installing inadequate capacity
41that will soon need to be expanded at extra cost." The Commission 
did not specify a minimum channel capacity, but mentioned that 20-channel 
systems were proposed by many cable operators in the larger markets.
The second document set forth specific requirements to provide sufficient 
channel availability. These include:
A) Local government channel: at least one channel for
use without charge by local government and for free 
political broadcasts during primary and general 
elections.
B) Local public access channels: in order to facili­
tate further presentation of views, cable systems 
will be required to make channel time available on 
one or more channels at no cost, to local citizens 
or groups, which are not engaged in programming for 
advertising revenue, but which desire to present 
views on matters of concern to them.
C) Leased channels: cable operators would make available
to third parties, either permanently or on a one-shot 
basis, channels for commercial operation by third parties.
39
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket 18894), 25 F.C.C. 2d., 1970, 
pp. 38-57.
40
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking (Docket 18397-A),
24 F.C.C. 2d., 1970, pp. 580-621.
41Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1970, p. 40.
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D) Channels devoted to instructional uses (e.g. courses 
conducted for students either by or in c.oord5.nation 
with public or private institutions; instruction by 
professional groups for their members, doctors, en­
gineers, etc*). We ask for comment on the number of 
such channels (e.g., a specified number; a percen­
tage of the system's capacity).^
The Commission requested comments on its proposals that systems of twenty
or more channels provide at least 5 0 percent of their channels, on
a demand basis, for the purpose specified in the Second Further Notice
43of Proposed Rulemaking. In regards to the leased channels, the Com­
mission re-emphasized their importance and promised to take"appropriate
action to insure their availability (e.g., that the rates charged in
44such channels are reasonable and nondiscriminatory)„" Although the
Commission did not use the words "common carrier," its specification
that the rates charged for the leased channel must be reasonable and
nondiscriminatory, thus implies at least a modified form of common 
45carrier access*
Cable Television Report and Order Sets Forth Rules 
Governing Use of Nonbroadcast Channels
The present rules governing community antenna television, the Cable
46
Television Report and Order, was released on February 12, 1972 and is
42
Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 1970, p. 587.
43-... ,Ibid.
44Ibid., footnote 14.
45Howard M. Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV: Problems and Proposals,"
37 Brooklyn Law Review, Vol. 37, 1971, p. 536.
46
Cable Television Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg., 1972, pp. 3252-
3341.
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best known as the "consensus agreement," The prelude to the most recent
cable television regulation has been characterized by Nicholas Johnson:
In future years, when students of law or government wish 
to study the decision making process at its worst, when 
they look for examples of industry domination of govern­
ment, when they look for Presidential interference in the 
operation of an agency responsible to Congress, they will 
look to the FCC handling of the never-ending saga of cable 
television as a classic case.^?
For more than three years the Commission gathered data, solicited views,
heard arguments, evaluated studies, examined alternatives and finally
turned to public panel discussions (unique in communications rule
making) in order to substantiate its current regulatory effort. The
rules the Commission finally adopted are the result of a number of
48
interwoven proceedings. In February, 1969, and March, 1971, oral 
presentations were heard between the Commission and recognized authori­
ties regarding specific issues of cable television regulation. Fol­
lowing these public proceedings the Commission formulated a plan for 
cable television, "designed to allow for fulfillment of the techno­
logical promise of cable and, at the same time, to maintain the
49existing structure of broadcasting."
These proposals were described before Congress and a formal "Letter 
50
of Intent" was released on August 5, 1971, which described in detail 
the course the FCC planned to adopt. But the "Letter of Intent" was
47
Steven R. Rivkin, Cable Television: A Guide to Federal Regula­
tion (Rand Corp. Memo. R-1138-NSF), March, 1973, p. 210.
48
Cable Television Report and Order, p. 3253.
49
Ibid.
50
FCC, Report tq^Congress, CATV Regulation, "Letter of Intent-" re­
printed in 22 P & F Radio Reg. 2d., 1971, pp. 1755-1772.
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met with sharp criticism particularly from broadcasters and copyright 
owners but with support from the White House and FCC chairman Dean Burch one 
result of the conflicts -among these four parties prompted a meeting 
where z
. . . the vested economic interests-^broadcasters (who 
felt threatened by this new technological competition), 
copyright holders (who were afraid cable systems would 
diminish the value of their products), and the cable 
industry (who felt threatened by the political power 
of the broadcasters--once joined by Chairman Burch and 
the President-*”to stop our August 5 policy entirely in 
Congress)--met with the representatives of the White 
House and with FCC Chairman Burch . . . .^1
Within three months the "consensus agreement" was born. Under the cir­
cumstances which the present cable regulations were conceived, it is 
not surprising, perhaps, that the Commission’s proposals for common 
carrier access differed little from the 1970 Second Further Notice of 
Proposed Rulemaking, even after extensive hearings before the Commission
by members of the American Civil Liberties Union, the primary advocates
52of common carrier access. Several sections of the 1972 Cable Tele-
vision Report and Order addressed themselves to access to and use of
nonbroadcast channels.
Sec. 120--The rules require 20 channel capacity (actual 
or potential) in the top 100 markets, also ad­
ditional channel 6 MHz in width suitable for 
transmission of Class II or Class III signals.
^"4livkin, A Guide to Federal Regulation, p. 215.
52
Statements of John de J. Pemberton, Jr. on behalf of New York 
Civil Liberties Union on Proposed Franchise Grants for Cable Service in 
the Borough of Manhattan, July 23, 1970; testimony to Illinois Commerce 
Commission by Jerrold N. Oppenheim on March 1, 1971; Irwin Karp before 
FCC on March 18, 1971. (Unpublished in FCC Reports)
\
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Sec,
Sec,
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121— In order to promote program diversity cable 
television systems will have to provide one 
dedicated, noncommercial public access chan­
nel available without charge at all times on 
a first-come, first-served nondiscriminatory 
basis and, without charge during a develop­
mental period, one channel for educational 
use and another channel for local government 
use,
122— The encouragement of UHF television was used 
to foster local service broadcasting; the pub­
lic access channel will offer a practical op­
portunity to participate in community dialogue 
through a mass medium, A system operator will 
be obliged to provide only use of the channel 
without charge, but production cost (aside from 
live studio presentations not exceeding 5 min­
utes in length) may be charged to users.
125— In addition to the designated channels and 
broadcast channels, cable systems shall make 
available for leased use the remainder of the 
required bandwidth; if the public, education, 
and Government access channels are not being 
used, they may be used for leased operation.
126— A new channel must be made operational whenever 
all operational channels are in use during 80 
percent of the weekdays, for 80 percent of the 
time during any consecutive 3-hour period for 6 
weeks running, the system will then have 6 
months in which to make a new channel available. 
(Known as the "N plus 1" rule)
128— Requires CATV operators to install return commu­
nication facilities on at- least a non-voice basis.
136— The Commission recognized that open access car­
ries with it certain risks, but that regulation 
awaits experience. Commission will explore the 
feasibility of providing a lock switch to cut 
off public access or leased channels, should 
subscribers wish to control channel selection.
137— Encourages experimentation in regards to the best 
way to handle applications for access time, how 
production facilities will be provided, how the 
public can obtain advance notice of which programs 
will be presented, etc.
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Sec. 140--Eases cable operators concerns about potential 
civil and criminal liability resulting from 
use of the public and leased access channels.
Since the cable operator has no control over 
content, it is unlikely that a suit would be 
brought against any CATV system over libelous 
material.
Sec. 143--The Commission encourages refinement of half-inch 
video tape and recording equipment that will be 
available to the public which does not conform to 
technical broadcast standards.
Sec. 146— The suggestion has been made that cable tele­
vision systems be prohibited from originating 
their own programming and be restricted entirely 
to a common carrier role. We have considered 
these possibilities but feel that it would be 
premature to adopt either at this time. At this 
stage in the development of the cable industry, 
it is the system operator who has the greatest 
incentive to produce originated material attrac­
tive to existing and potential subscribers. We 
have tried to encourage this origination both 
through our origination rules and by structuring 
the broadcast signal carriage rules to stimulate 
the development of nonbroadcast services. At the v 
same time, we have recognized that during this 
developmental stage we should not adopt rules that 
constrain experimentation and innovation in the 
services that.cable systems provide but, rather, 
that we should seek to keep our future options 
open. When cable penetration reaches high levels 
and demand increases for leased channel operations, 
we will revisit this matter. For now, we remain 
of the view that the most appropriate mix for the 
orderly development of cable and for encouraging 
the maximization of its potential for public bene­
fit is one that embraces . . .  a multipurpose CATV 
operation combining carriage of broadcast signals 
with program origination and common carrier service.
These access rules will be applicable to all new systems that become 
operational after March 31, 1972, in the top 100 markets. Systems cur­
rently operating in those markets have until March 31, 1977, to comply.
53
Cable Television Report and Order, pp. 3269-3272.
Reconsideration of Report and Order Encourages
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Common Carrier Experimentation
On July 14, 1972, the FCC made public its Reconsideration of Report 
54
and Order wherein the Commission acknowledged the American Civil Liber­
ties Union's challenge of the Commission's authority to require cable 
systems serving 3,500 or more subscribers to originate their own pro­
gramming while urging common carrier operations on some cable channels. 
Answering the ACLU, the FCC referred back to their consideration in the 
1972 Cable Television Report and Order;
The ACLU's approach, which may prove sound eventually, 
at the present time does not afford the industry the 
flexibility that we desire to encourage experimentation 
and innovation. Further, we doubt very much if, in new 
systems in major markets, a scarcity of access channels 
will arise from a cable operator's excessive use of band­
width for his own origination purposes; but if a problem 
should arise, we shall be alert to take action to main­
tain our emphasis on the provision of a c c e s s  c h a n n e l s . ^5
The brief history of common carrier doctrine in relation to commu­
nity antenna television can be characterized by a regulatory turn-about. 
At first the FCC in Frontier Broadcasting Co. deemed cable television 
not to be a common carrier because the customer exercised no choice in 
selecting the television signals that were to be delivered. The healthy 
survival of UHF broadcasting seemed to be an underlying factor in the 
FCC's compulsory carriage and major-market/distant-station policies 
which in turn seemed to negate the rationale of the Frontier case. The 
Commission has yet to re-evaluate the Frontier decision. A conflict 
arose in subsequent legislation due to the dual role that the Commission
54
Reconsideration of Report and Order, 37 Fed. Reg., 1972, pp. 13848- 
13910. — -------— ---- ------------------------
55Ibid., p. 13857.
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placed CATV systems under by requiring cablecast5„ng and encouraging com­
mon carrier operations on some cable channels. Currently, CATV is in a 
state of flux. The FCC does not regulate cable television as a common 
carrier but has encouraged operators to experiment as common carriers 
on some channels. The Commission says it intends to revisit the matter 
at a later stage in the development of cable. "It is, nevertheless, 
an issue which must be resolved before CATV achieves large-scale, multi­
channel capacity; vesting control of forty or more communication channels
56in one entity invites their abuse."
^^Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 839.
CHAPTER IV
THE ECONOMICS OF COMMON CARRIER CABLE TELEVISION
The economics of a common carrier cable system are complex. The 
preceding chapters have examined the technological and regulatory aspects 
of a common carrier CATV system. Reception problems inherent in multi­
channel cable systems await the development of more sophisticated broad­
cast equipment and scholars feel with some farsightedness on the part of 
government agencies some of the regulatory problems could become un­
tangled. But the issue of cable economics is a different story. While 
experts feel the technological and regulatory problems can be somewhat 
stabilized, economically cable television is subject to fluctuations of 
the marketplace. To further complicate matters, cable television opera­
tors are not only burdened with the problems of rate structures, but as 
broadcasters they must face the issues inherent in that industry as well, 
including program costs and advertising.
These two areas, CATV rate regulation coupled with the programming 
function of cable television, pose complicated problems.
Regulation of Subscription Fees and Access 
Rates Poses Economic Problems
Regulation of rates by cable companies has been a sensitive issue. 
Fear of public-utility ratemaking on the classic rate-of-return model 
has been a principal reason for the cable industry’s opposition to any 
type of common carrier or public utility status. Industry spokesmen
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usually point to the case of Connecticut as an example of how state reg­
ulation (including rate regulation) has completely stifled cable growth.* 
Rate regulation for common carrier CATV has three aspects? (a) the 
regulation of rates for rental of studio equipment, (b) the regulation
of rates which subscribers pay to receive the cable services and (c) the
2
regulation of rates which users pay to lease a channel. An argument
against regulating the first aspect is possible since the business of
3
renting studio equipment is not a natural monopoly. However, the 
purpose of requiring the CATV company to maintain a studio is to insure 
that the citizens who can least afford to buy their own equipment will 
have feasible opportunity for access to this medium. Hence, rate regu­
lation of the rental of studio equipment can be justified as a necessary
4and integral aspect of common carrier CATV. The second and third areas 
of rate regulation are closely related since both the user and subscriber 
pay to receive the benefit of a given channel. For example, a subscriber 
who pays $10 per month to receive twenty channels of programming pays 
$.50 per month per channel. A user who leases one of those channels also 
pays a monthly, daily or hourly fee for that same channel. Thus, 
assuming the profits of the CATV company are regulated on a full cost 
basis, the regulation of access rates will necessitate the
Office of the General Counsel, National Cable Television Associa­
tion, "The CATV Industry & Regulation," (pamphlet, no page numbers or 
date).
2
Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV," p. 543.
3
Richard Posner, "Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation," Stanford 
Law Review, Vol. 21, 1970, p. 575.
^Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV," p. 543.
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5
r e g u l a t i o n  of s u b s c r i b e r  r a t e s .  T h e  i n t e r  r-e- 
l a t e d n e s s  b e t w e e n  t h e  . rates being charged to users and those 
to subscribers presents the problem of how these rates should be 
apportioned.
Lack of Economic Guidelines Makes the Establishment
of a "Fair Rate-of"Return1’ Difficult
By far the most controversial aspect of rate regulation for common 
carrier cable television is in establishing a "fair" rate of return.
One proposal calls for a regulatory commission which would ascertain 
rate base, rate strueture,allowed rate of return, etc. Such issues 
as valuation of equipment costs, anticipated obsolescence, marginal 
cost factors and market forces would have to be considered by the 
regulatory commission.
The economic complexities of a CATV common carrier are probably
most evident, in the circular process of determining a standard for a
"fair rate of return."
An appropriate definition of the fair rate of return 
must take into account the risk characteristics of the 
investment. But these risk characteristics in turn are 
determined in large part by the behavior of the 
regulatory commission. How much variance there will 
be in the earnings of a regulated company depends upon 
how often the regulatory agency re-determines the rate struc­
ture and the allowed rate of return and wnau basis it 
uses for such determinations. There are no investment 
risks which are really comparable to those involved in 
investment in a regulated utility other than investment 
in another regulated utility. Thus, many state regula­
tory commissions in an effort to escape circularity
5Ibid.
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set their allowed rate of return by reference to the 
return allowed in the state next door. Cumulatively, 
the results of this process are not satisfactory.6
There are numerous plans and objections to rate-of-return regulation in 
general which cannot be discussed at length here. It is important to 
point out the complexities and hazards to economic regulation of rela­
tively new ventures such as cable television. Although many existing 
cable companies have been quite profitable from the outset, extension 
of cable into major urban markets already served by multiple television 
stations probably involves substantial financial risk. If rate-of- 
return regulation which minimizes the reward for entrepreneurship is 
imposed, businessmen might be discouraged from starting new ventures 
into the cable television industry. The extension of common carrier 
principles to the regulation of rates on the cable involves numerous 
practical and theoretical problems.
Whatever the merits from the point of view of diversity 
of access to giving the cable common carrier status an 
economic analysis counsels caution before applying the 
rate-setting aspects of common carrier regulation.7
State Public Utility Regulation of CATV 
Resembles Common Carrier Regulation
The problem of rate regulation for cable television is far more 
significant than merely determining specified rate bases and rate 
structures, and has become a key point of contention between those who 
advocate local vs. state vs*, federal regulation of cable television.
Leonard M. Ross, Economic and Legal Aspects of CATV Systems 
(Working Paper IX, Prepared for Center for Policy Research and Columbia 
University), 1972, p. 146.
^Ibia., p. 154.
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The regulatory problem overlaps economic issues and vice-versa.
When the need for regulation finally became apparent 
however, response came from every governmental level 
--cities, states and the Federal Government. This 
surge of activity has produced a regulatory nightmare 
haunted by overlapping jurisdictions and conflicting 
regulations•®
This dilemma has come to be known as "three-tier regulation." Arguments 
have been built supporting regulation at each level of government. Al­
though these arguments are not within the scope of this study, this 
multi-jurisdictional system of CATV regulation could pose the thorny 
constitutional problem of deciding which regulatory scheme to sustain 
for common carrier operations.
On the local level, planning and franchising CATV systems must take 
place within the framework of federal and state laws. Local authority 
to franchise and regulate cable television derives from the cable systcm*s 
need for access to city streets, utility poles and other rights-of-way.
The recent Cable Television Report and Order contains rules and guide­
lines that strongly affect the choices open to local franchising 
authorities. The FCC limits franchise fees to 5 percent of total sub­
scribers revenues and requires a special showing if the fee is more than 
9
3 percent. The franchising authority must show that the higher fee is 
justified by a local regulatory program for cable. The Commission also 
requires that rates for leased channels be reasonable and nondiscrimina- 
tory. Federal and local regulation of rates and revenues has been some­
what unstructured. The primary significance of three-tier regulation is
Q
Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 816.
9
Cable Television Report and Order, p. 3281.
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the move in the past three years toward enactment of legislation sub­
jecting cable television to state regulation through the state’s exis­
ting public utilities commission. This action is directly related to 
this study, as public utility regulation resembles common carrier 
regulations in some r e s p e c t s . T h e  legal basis for this action stems 
from TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor*-*- in which the Supreme Court held that 
states, and by implication local government, had the power to regulate
those aspects of CATV upon which the FCC had not acted.
12 13 14Before 1971, five states--Connecticut, Nevada, Rhode Island,
15 16Vermont, and Hawaii had each adopted legislation creating a state
17 18regulatory commission to govern CATV. In 1971 New York and New Jersey
imposed a one-year moratorium on the franchises of cable systems while
legislatures sought to devise a state regulatory plan. Two states,
.19 20Illinois and Massachusetts followed this action in January, 1972.
^Sol Schildhause, Chief, Cable Television Bureau, Federal Communi­
cations Commission, personal letter, May 25, 1973.
U TV Pix, Inc. v. Taylor, 15 P A F Radio Ree.. (D. Nev.). 1968. 
pp. 2004-ZI13.-- — ------ 1---
^Conn. Stats, ch. 289, sec. 16-330 to 333 (1966 Rev.).
^^Nev. Rev. Stat. 711.010 et seg. (Supp. 1971).
14R.I . Gen. Laws Ann. sec. 39-19-1 et seg. (Supp. 1970).
15Vt. Stat. Ann. ch. 30, sec. 501 et seg. (Supp. 1971).
^1970 Hawaii Laws ch. 114.
*^N.Y. Gen. Munic. Laws sec. 88 (McKinney Supp. 1972).
*®New Jersey Laws (1971) Reg. Sess. ch. 221.
19Illinois Commerce Commission, Investigation of Cable Television 
and Other Forms of Broadband Cable Communications in the State of Illinois,
reprinted in 22 P A F Radio Reg. 2d., 1971, pp. 2192-2206. 
20Mass. Gen. Laws (1971) Reg. Sess. ch. 113.
75
21 . 22 State regulation of cable TV is pending in Iowa and California.
The states now regulating CATV placed cable within the general scheme 
of public utility regulation by statutory enactment. In addition to 
requiring that cable systems obtain a certificate of public convenience 
and necessity and filing tariff schedules, these states establish at 
least the semantic basis for rate regulation by classifying CATV as a 
public utility. There are significant differences in each state’s 
approach to the issue of rate regulation. Only the Nevada statute 
explicitly gives its commission the power to set rates; the Connec­
ticut statute limits the "rates of return to the amount that is fair,
23 24just and reasonable." Vermont is completely silent on the matter
25while the Rhode Island statute prohibits discriminatory rates but 
does not explicitly give its commission any power to make rates.
These commissions have a general authority to regulate public 
utility rates which presumably extends to CATV by nature of their 
definition. The cable industry has a traditional fear of state regu­
lation and there appears to be a certain hesitancy on the part of some 
states to impose it, perhaps due to the belief that CATV lacks
21
Barnett, "Regulation of Cable Television," p. 687.
22
Senate Bills #1330, #754, introduced by Senator Anthony Beilenson, 
May 7, 1973, and Senator Alfred E. Alquist, April 2, 1973, California 
State Capitol Bill Room.
2 3Howard E. Hausman, Chairman, Public Utilities Commission, State 
of Connecticut, personal letter, June 9, 1973.
A /
Susan M. Hudson, Public Service Board, State of Vermont, personal 
letter, July 11, 1973.
25Loraine Silberthau, Division of Public Utilities and Carriers, 
State of Rhode Island and Providence: Plantations, personal letter,
June 21, 1973.
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sufficient public utility characteristics to constitutionally support
2 6such a regulation. According to scholars, this proposition seems 
doubtful. CATV systems usually have an exclusive franchise and thus 
fall within any classical definition of public utility. Furthermore, 
even if a cable company does not have an exclusive franchise, it cer­
tainly seems to meet the Supreme Court's exceedingly liberal test of
27a business "affected with a public interest."
The real problem with cable rate regulation seems to be its stan­
dards. The use of traditional evaluation methods creates a risk of 
setting the rate base either too high or too low. Since CATV involves 
a large initial investment with small immediate return, a newly- 
constructed CATV system may require setting an artifically low rate 
base. On the other hand, if the CATV system is well-established and 
has been depreciated over a substantial period of time, a higher base
would be appropriate. Thus, rates must be based upon*a flexible formula
that correlates the high cost of constructing a CATV system with the
28comparatively low cost of operating it.
Proposals That Attempt to Establish Reasonable 
Subscription Fees and Access Rates
Subscription and Access Costs Charged On a
Per Channel, Per Month Basis
One proposal is that the rates for all non-commercial users be 
regulated so that the cost per channel per month will be the same as the 
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Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 824.
‘“^ Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S., 1877, p. 113.
28
Botein, "Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 825.
the monthly subscription cost, divided by the number of channels and
29
multiplied by the number of subscribers. Thus the cost of sending a
one hour program will be equal to the total cost all CATV subscribers
pay to receive that program--whether or not they watch it. Another 
30proposal is that the subscriber pay a nominal monthly charge which 
would cover upkeep of the system and allow him to receive the local 
broadcast stations. In addition, the subscriber could choose from the 
available cable programming and pay a per-program cost, receiving an 
itemized bill at the end of the month. The cost for each program will 
include a fixed fee for channel usage plus any charges imposed by the 
user. Thus a locally produced, non-commercial program might cost the 
home subscriber a few cents (the user's transmission costs divided by 
the number of viewers of that program) unless the non-commercial user 
was willing to pay his own transmission costs. Assuming advertisers 
will be willing to subsidize the transmission costs of some programs, 
local commercial programs will be free to the subscriber. The disad­
vantage of this proposal is that non-commercial users such as politicians, 
will be faced with the choice of either paying for the time themselves 
or requiring the viewer to pay to hear their message. A combination 
of these proposals might allow educational and cultural institutions 
to be given preferential rate treatment, and political candidates in the 
particular franchise area an equal allotment of free time, both sub-
29
Liberman, "Common Carrier CATV," p. 543.
30Leiand Johnson, The Future of Cable Television: Some Problems
of Federal Regulation (Rand Corp. Memo. RM-6199-FF), January, 1970, 
pp. 56-61.
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sidized by increasing the monthly cost to all subscribers— whether or
31
not they wish to watch these programs.
Allow Rates to be Determined by 
the Economic "Marketplace"
On the opposite side of the issue, is the belief that common car­
rier access to cable systems can be achieved by a regulation imposing 
the requirement that access to channels be provided on a fair and non-
discriminatory basis and that no further regulation of rate level or
32
return is warranted in cable systems for the forseeable future.
This approach is supported by the difficulties of 
arriving at any coherent regulatory standard for reg­
ulating rate levels or rates of return. Commonly, 
rate levels for utilities are supposed to provide a 
reasonable return on investment-rate base. This 
traditional concept would be difficult to apply in 
the present situation. Cable systems have been 
initiated on the basis of subscriber payments. The 
cable operator will receive revenues from subscribers 
fees (which are not now regulated) and from adver­
tising on its own program originations (which are 
not likely to be controlled)•33
One of the primary arguments for minimal rate regulation is based 
on the belief that for cable to grow, it must be allowed a great deal 
of freedom.
At this particular point in time, at the beginning 
of the hoped for communications revolution, restric­
tions and regulations can only prevent allowing the
31Ibid., p. 26.
32
Lionel Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications: 
Regulatory and Economic Issues (A Report for the Sloan Commission), 
August, 1971, p. 17.
33J Ibid.
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evolution of cable to its full potential* Instead of
anticipating problems, perhaps we would do well to wait
and take actions when problems actually evolve.^
The cable industry is a high risk business, and contrary to popu­
lar belief, "urban cable TV systems are not unlimited roads to immediate 
35riches." As a capital-intensive business, cable operators must invest 
a great deal more to generate a dollar of income than many other indus­
tries. For first generation cable, plant commitment alone, excluding 
operating and other expenses was three dollars invested for each dollar 
in sales. Television station investment runs about a dollar investment
for every dollar in sales and in some areas* TV sales may run ten dollars
in plant expense. Cable earnings were one-fifth the revenue of the 
broadcast industry, but had half as much total capital committed. As 
cable operators move into the urban areas, capital investment may be 
more than doubled. Instead of a minimum of $80 to $120 which is today's
investment per subscriber in plant cost, approximately $450 per sub-
37scriber is anticipated to build tomorrow's major market system.
Corporations generally are able to fund 60 to 70 percent of their 
requirements from internal sources. Cable will be fortunate if it can 
generate 20 to 25 percent of its capital requirements in the next ten 
years.
3 ^
Lois Brown, "Common Carrier: Is This the Public Interest?" (Report
Prepared for Metrotel Communications, Inc., Philadelphia), 1972, p. 4.
^Ibid., p. 5.
36T, 'Ibid., p. 7.
37Communication News, untitled article, July, 1972, p. 17.
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There is a need for a vast amount of external long term 
financing. An unfavorable regulatory climate will cer­
tainly make finaneing a great deal more difficult in 
some cases virtually impossible to obtain . . . .  In 
addition to the need to provide some incentive for 
prospective investors, and some promise of a reasonable 
return for the operator, a relatively high level of 
earnings is required for the type of local program pro­
duction we all hope to see. To restrict subscription 
fees instead of allowing them to be determined by the 
market-place would be to place unfair, and at this point 
unnecessary burdens upon the i n d u s t r y .
Establish Different Classifications of Access Users 
and Charge a Flat Fee
A proposal that has been supported by the American Civil Liberties 
Union is to charge a flat fee to lease channels as opposed to allowing 
the cable operator to charge either a share of the revenue or a percen­
tage of profit. This plan would set up functional classifications of
users (i.e. educators community groups) with different regulated fees 
39for such users. The basis for this proposal is that the cable opera­
tor would discriminate against some kinds of users without such pro­
visions, as in some cases he might be able to obtain 50 percent of the 
profits and if so he would avoid educational, low income or non-profit 
users.
But there are some who feel the ACLU proposal is fallacious. Since
there are functional classifications of users with different rate
schedules, the operator could still discriminate by showing preference
40
for one classification of user over another unless regulated further.
38
Brown, "Common Carrier: Is This the Public Interest?" p. 8.
39Ibid., p. 12.
A0Ibid.
In other fields of communication or transportation, as has pre­
viously been discussed, the law requires a common carrier to make its 
facilities available to all members of the general public at rates set 
by a governmental regulatory authority. Usually the authority is 
directed by statute to set an overall level of rates designed to afford 
the carrier a fair rate of return on its invested capital. The regula­
tory commission may be instructed to assure that the rates are "fair" 
and "nondiscriminatory" and may require the carrier to make its service 
physically available (by extending a railway line or a telecommunica­
tions pathway) to all residents in a given geographical area. In 
short, the institution of "common carrier" regulation customarily en­
tails a related series of restrictions on rates, services, equipment 
and access— enforced by a regulatory agency.
CHAPTER V
£a t v p r og ramming c o nflicts w i t h common ca rr i e r status
At present, virtually all cable systems are owned by private cor­
porations. They are allowed to operate by virtue of having obtained a 
franchise from the local municipality or in some cases the state govern­
ment . The franchise agreement may obligate the cable system owner to 
provide dedicated channels available free of charge to the local govern­
ment, the school system or other agencies* It may prohibit certain kinds 
of programming such as "pay cable" programs for which a separate charge 
is made for receiving that particular program. The.FCC also mandates 
additional kinds of programs: distant signal carriage is subject to
strict regulation and minimal cable-sponsored origination of programming 
is required for systems with more than a stipulated minimum number of 
subscribers. Aside from these restrictions and those dealing with the 
Fairness Doctrine and equal-time rules, the cable operator is himself 
the judge of what will and will not be transmitted over the cable. As 
a result, some scholars have suggested that the requirement for CATV to 
operate as a common carrier is unnecessary; a rational cable entrepreneur 
would, in the normal course of profit maximization make channel space avail­
able to any other entrepreneur who could use it more effectively than he 
could himself. But concern has been expressed about possible conflic­
ting interests inherent in common carrier CATV.
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First it is contended by communication experts that any marginal
economic benefits from common carrier access would be outweighed by the
*
system operator* s concern over possible adverse impact upon him of use
of such channels because it could subject him to liability, be offen-.
sive to subscribers or violate his duties for balanced presentations.^
Second it is felt that common carrier access would conflict with the
2interests of cable operators in their own programming originations.
FCC Prohibits Program Censorship But has Failed
to Explicitly Grant Immunity to CATV Operators
Liability has been a thorny issue since the beginning of the common 
carrier doctrine. Now there are some serious considerations posed in 
regards to the legal liability of broadcasters for the dissemination of 
libelous, fraudulent or obscene material. The common course Of action 
a cable operator has taken is to exercise control over content in order 
to protect himself. But since the cable system provides instantaneous 
access into subscribers' homes, it seems unacceptable to the public for 
the operator to avoid all responsibility, particularly in relation to 
the transmitting of obscene material. A common carrier precedent is the 
telephone system's practice to avoid transmission of known illegal 
matter, including obscene material which it enforces by termination 
of service. "A similar obligation is appropriate here."
Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications, p. 26. 
2Ibid.
3Ibid., p. 29.
Concern has also been expressed about the prospect of vocal extrem 
ists using common carrier channels for sensationalism or political con­
frontations •
The ground for such concern may be exaggerated; a rabble 
rouser on one of the ten cable channels may obtain no 
greater public recognition than he would speaking on a 
street corner, or public park.4
Common carrier cable would in part be an electronic public forum and
thus carries with it many of the same problems inherent in the First
Amendment.
There is also the question of fraud and libel and most communica­
tion scholars agree it is proper to hold the programmer liable, not the 
5
cable system. If the cable system assumed responsibility, this would 
lead to prior screening of program content, which is inconsistent with 
the concept of common carrier access.
Perhaps the unsettled issue of CATV liability can be adequately 
accomodated within present law. Cable system immunity seems to be sup­
ported by the recent trend of Supreme Court decisions which have dras­
tically narrowed newspaper liability for libel related to public issues 
permitting recovery only for actual malice.^ Furthermore, the FCC's 
requirement that cable systems operate as common carriers on some chan­
nels may itself exempt the cable operator from liability. In 1959 in 
the WDAY case^ the Supreme Court held that the statutory obligation of
^Ibid., p. 32.
5Ibid., p. 29.
^The New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., 1964, p. 254.
^Farmers Educational & Cooperative Union of America, North Dakota 
Division v. WDAY, Inc., 360 U.S., 1959, pp. 525-547.
a broadcaster to provide equal access to political candidates with the 
explicit stipulation that broadcast licensees could not censor,estab­
lished an immunity for broadcasters against any liability for defamatory 
statements made in such political broadcasts. An argument could be made 
that the required operation on a common carrier basis b5>- cable companies 
could be interpreted within the scope of the federal statute set forth 
in WDAY.
The recent rulings by the FCC, although explicit in wording, seem 
to cloud the issue. The FCC has declared that cable operators "should 
have no control over program content except as may be required by the
g
Commission's rules and applicable law." The New York City franchise
also provides that programming on leased channels "shall be free from
any control by the Company except as is required to protect the Company
9from liability under applicable law." The rulings do not clarify what
the "applicable law" is, or whether it can be altered by a regulation
imposing common carrier status.
Apart from the legal aspects of liability, cable operators may be
concerned that an open access could result in dissemination of material
offensive to some people.
Like a broadcaster, a system operator prefers the goodwill 
of the public and will be sensitive to criticism particu­
larly in the developmental stage of his system. No doubt
it is for this reason that many cable operators regard the 
common carrier proposal as a threat or at least as a 
nuisance. It is understandable that they have resisted 
attempts to experiment with common carrier access. It
8Cable Television Report and Order, p. 3289.
9Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York,
p. 49.
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is obviously impossible to expect a cable system operator 
to voluntarily undertake such a policy, so long as he can­
not in the eyes of the community disclaim the responsibility 
for the programming. The latter obstacle, at least, should 
be overcome if the common carrier obligation were imposed 
upon him as a matter of law. *-0
CATV Operator's Obligation to Grant Channel Access 
May Conflict with Program Origination Requirement
The FCC has required that all cable systems having 3,500 or more 
subscribers will be required to utilize one channel for origination 
of substantial amounts of programming. The validity of this ruling 
is justified by the fact that, at low levels of cable penetration, the 
principal economic value of program diversity will be to attract sub­
scribers. As cable penetration reaches substantial proportions, com­
mercial opportunities increase. Concern has been expressed that a con­
flict may then develop between the cable operator's interests as a 
broadcaster on the origination channel and his obligations to provide 
access to others."^
It is believed that the cable operator, like other broadcasters
would be strongly averse to fragmenting his audience by programming on
additional channels, and may seek to reduce such usage by excessive
rates or other tactics. In contrast to this view is the idea that:
The danger of conflict-of-interest is lessened in as much 
as the system operator is already competing for audience 
with local and distant over-the-air signals so that the 
additional impact of common carrier users is not likely 
to be substantial. Moreover, the objective requirement of  ^
large channel capacity should prevent exclusionary tendencies.
10Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications, p. 32.
Ibid., p. 26.
12Ibid.. p. 27.
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Nevertheless, there may be basis for this concern at a later stage when 
cable penetration is higher and more stable. At that point, the incen­
tive to add or the risk of losing subscribers will be low, and the 
cable operator's interest in enhancing the revenues of his origination 
channel may become significant. Perhaps, the ultimate solution to this 
problem would be to require the cable company to cease engaging in pro­
gramming and begin operations as a common carrier when a cable system 
achieves a certain size. This solution has been incorporated by the 
New York Public Service Commission: "when any single system, operated
substantially as a coordinated whole reaches a certain size (say 50,000 
subscribers), the Public Service Commission shall have authority to
direct that the system be converted into a 'communications common 
13*
carrier!" " This plan would allow the cable operator to engage in
programming through separate affiliates. This approach seems adequate
to avert problems of discrimination which throughout the history of
the common carrier doctrine have been substantial.
Any tendency the cable system might have to reduce 
the number of competitive program services would be 
prevented by the nondiscriminatory rates available 
to others (as well as its affiliate) and the unavoid­
able existence of unused channels on the basis of the 
installed capacity of the system.
Jones, Regulation of Cable Television bv the State of New York,
p. 199.
"k
This is a familiar pattern for the FCC which adopted a similar 
pattern toward telephone companies engaging in data processing activi­
ties; it permitted them to do so through separate corporate affiliates 
subject to segragation of accounts, prohibition of favoritism to carrier 
affiliates, and other safeguards (Docket 16974, Computer Communications 
Inquiry, April 1, 1970).
14
Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications9 p. 28.
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The Distinction Between Common Carrier 
Status and "Public Access'*
Proposals for common carrier status for CATV are designed to elim­
inate the conjectured conflict between the cable operator's interest as a 
broadcaster and his obligation to grant access to others. These proposals 
contend that ownership of the cable system should carry no special say 
over program content. The cable operator should be required to make time 
available to all comers on equal terms. In this manner, the general user
would become the program authority, and the owner of the cable system
15would be relegated to a role as a kind of "traffic-.cop."
The primary advocate of common carrier cable television has been the 
American Civil Liberties Union. Their reasons for advocating common 
carrier status are stated thusly:
1. Cable television is technically capable of serving as a common 
carrier.
2. Common carrier cable systems would assure full freedom of expres­
sion and communication. All sides on any political or social 
issue could have access to the cable system without need of a
"fairness doctrine."
3. A common carrier cable system will more effectively serve the
public interest. The physical and economic limitations of over-
16the-air broadcasting severely limit diversity of programming.
15Ross, Economic and Legal Aspects of CATV Systems, p. 117.
^Statement of the American Civil Liberties Union in the Matter of 
Amendment of Part 74, Subpart K, of the Commission's Rules and Regula­
tions Relative to Community Antenna Television Systems; and Inquiry into 
the Development of Communications Technology and Services to Formulate 
Regulatory Policy and Rulemaking and/or Legislative Proposals, Docket 
#18397-A, March 18, 1971. (unpublished in FCC Reports)
\
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But as this study has already revealed, methods must be found to solve 
the problems of rate regulation, liability, poor reception and alloca­
tion of available channels.
The creation of a common carrier formula is, of course, 
far more difficult for CATV than for a telephone or 
telegraph company. As one commentator has indicated, 
any definition of non-discriminatory access to CATV 
involves many quasi-subjective determinations, e.g., 
evaluating the time shown, the channel used and the 
adjacent program. Although the problem is obviously 
not subject to exact resolution, some attempt must 
be made to formulate standards.1?
Perhaps a problem in formulating standards for common carrier CATV 
is one of semantics. The Federal Communications Commission and advo­
cates of common carrier status often use the term "public access." 
Lately, the terms "common carrier" and "public access" are used so 
interchangeably that they are often treated as one-and-the-same. But 
there is a basic difference, at least frbm a regulatory standpoint.
Pure and total common carrier regulation as applied to cable TV would 
completely separate the ownership of the cable system from any power to 
decide what the cable system is to transmit. The cable operator's role 
would be restricted to leasing channels to others, and regulation would 
assure that producers and distributors could lease channels at fair and
reasonable terms. The system owner could not supply any services or
18
originate any programming himself. It seems that advocates of common 
carrier access to cable do not propose in their regulatory scheme pure 
and total common carrier cable because:
^Botein, "A Jumble of Jurisdictions," p. 839.
18
Brown, "Common Carrier: Is This the Public Interest?" p. 2.
9Q
. . .  this.would mean that the CATV system could not carry 
existing broadcast stations without payment for channel 
leasing by the broadcast industry, i.e., local broadcast 
stations as well as imported signals would be treated 
the same way as any other "user” of any kind, and would 
have to pay the cable operator to transmit the broadcast
signals.
It is very doubtful that broadcasters would pay cable operators for 
signal transmission and without over-the-air broadcast signals, especi­
ally distant signals, CATV could not survive. What advocates seem to 
be asking for is a modified version of the common carrier doctrine. 
Public access is a fairly new phenomenon. During the FCC's landmark 
panel hearings on CATV in March, 1971, where the present regulatory 
policies were being debated there was also the growing crescendo of 
Voices asking for "access" to cable television. These demands were 
based on the premise that from a technological standpoint, CATV could 
provide an unlimited number of channels. The terms "common carrier" or 
"public access" have come to mean a hands-off policy regarding govern­
ment regulation of CATV. Cable television seems to be evolving from 
a business of merely providing clearer television reception to a concept 
of participatory television. Any person with an idea will have access
to the communications system; a person will be able to talk back to
20his television set.
To understand the difference between common carrier and public 
access, the development of the latter needs to be examined. As has been
19Ibid.
20
Nicholas Johnson and Gary G. Gerlock, "The Coming Fight for Cable 
Access," Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2, 1972. p. 218.
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pointed out, there are many economic and legal implications implicit in 
the common carrier doctrine. But the roots of the public access concept 
are philosophical in nature. To come to grips with this is to under­
stand the conflict between the optimistic cry for "public access" on the 
one hand, and the economic, legal and technical "realities" of the cable 
television industry on the other.
Theory of Access Established as a New 
"Right to Hear" in Red Lion Case
21
The case for public access has roots deep in our speech tradition.
The First Amendment reads in part that, "Congress shall make no law
22
. . . .  abridging the freedom of speech or of the press . • . • "
The First Amendment*s roots are in the classical argument of John Stuart
Mill who thought that only through open discussion is truth discovered^
23and spread.
As Justice Holmes and Brandeis understood the First 
Amendment's guarantee of freedom of expression, "the 
best test of truth is the power of the thought to 
get itself accepted in the competition of the market," 
and in a government of free men, "the deliberative 
forces should prevail over the arbitrary." Not only 
is free speech fundamental; it is paramount, having 
been accorded a "preferred" position above all other 
constitutional rights because other rights depend so 
heavily on free speech.24
More recently the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the Holmes-BrAndeis mar­
ketplace of ideas theory by declaring in the New York Times case a
21Ibid., p. 219.
22
U.S., Constitution, Amendment I.
23
John Stuart Mill, On Liberty (People's ed.), 1926, pp. 9-32.
24Johnson and Geriock, "Fight for Cable Access," p. 219.
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"profound national commitment to the principle that debate on public
25
issues should be uninhibited, robust, and wide-open."
The legal basis for freedom of speech, access to be heard, unin­
hibited marketplace of ideas or whatever acronymn one wishes to use has
2 6been cited in several cases throughout legal history. But in 1969
the Supreme Court in a landmark decision, laid the groundwork for the
27
newly emerging "doctrine of public access." The Red Lion case was 
the Supreme Court's unanimous rejection of the broadcasting industry's 
argument that the "Fairness Doctrine" was unconstitutional. But as a 
result of Red Lion broader implications were discussed than just a con­
stitutional test of the Fairness Doctrine.
Red Lion reveals an interplay between the older technical 
limited access theory, which was justified on the basis 
of limitations in the spectrum and the new First Amend­
ment based theory of access, which attempts to provide 
mechanisms for the interchange of ideas in the dominant
media.28
The Court's decision heavily emphasized maximizing opportunities for
expression. Some legal scholars contend that the wording in Red Lion
creates a new "right to hear," that is, a constitutional right to more
29
diversity in the broadcast programming available to the public.
25New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S., 1964, p. 254.
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S., 1945, pp. 1-20; see 
also Packaged Programs v. Westinghouse Broadcasting Co., 255 F. 2d., 
(3rd Cir.), 1958, pp. 708-710.
^ R e d  Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, 16 P & F Radio Reg., 1969, pp. 
708-710.
28Jerome A. Barron, "Access--The Only Choice for the Media," Texas 
Law Review, Vol. 48, 1970, p. 770.
29
Johnson and Gerlock, "Fight for Cable Access," p. 219,
93
The Court stated;
It is the right of the public to receive suitable access 
to social, political, esthetic, moral and other ideas 
and experiences which are crucial here. That right may 
not be abridged either by Congress or the FCC.30
Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court and emphasized that the 
right of the viewers and listeners, not the right of the broadcasters, 
is paramount. White stated that "it is the purpose of the First Amend­
ment to preserve an uninhibited marketplace of ideas in which truth
31will ultimately prevail.11
The Court relied on the limitation-of-the-spectrum argument for
its concluding opinion; even though advances in technology, such as
microwave transmission, have led to more efficient utilization of the
frequency spectrum.
On the other hand, the opinion is filled with observations 
that give it a radical undertone throughout and that dis­
play the constant tension in the opinion, and perhaps in 
the Court, between a rationale for broadcast regulation 
based on limitations of the spectrum and one based on max­
imizing opportunities for e x p r e s s i o n . 32
Although Red Lion does not specifically set forth access provisions,
the implications of a new "right" seem evident. It is unfortunate,
though, that the words "interest," "need" and "right" are sometimes
used Interchangeably. The legal implications of a "right" are very
33different from the implications of a need or an interest. But the 
wording in Red Lion seems to support the point that access to social, 
political ideas is a right of the public.
^Red Lion Broadcasting Co. v. FCC, p .  2048.
~^Ibid., p. 2047.
■^Barron, "Access--The Only Choice," p. 770.
33Geoffrey L. Thomas, "The Listener's Right to Hear in Broadcasting," 
Stanford Law Review, Vol. 22, 1970, p. 872.
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Advocates of public access not only point to the language of the
Supreme Court opinion, but contend that the inadequacies of the present
broadcasting industry fails to provide a marketplace of ideas.
As Walter Lippmann has noted, the mass media are not par­
ticularly well-suited to the dialectical process of finding 
truth. Most people listen to radio and television sporad­
ically and will not hear the essential evidence and the main 
arguments on all sides of an issue. Moreover, the idea 
that radio and television currently provide a marketplace 
of ideas and that they are producing truth is a myth; if 
there is a marketplace, it is at best an imperfect market.
The broadcasting industry does not and cannot provide the 
"truth"; even with the best of efforts of most current 
broadcasters, the listener must still work vigorously for 
it. Distortion by suppression, emphasis and inadequate 
depth is endemic to all communication. In furthering the 
"marketplace of ideas," the Court may be attempting to 
encourage diversity rather than "truth." There is a pre­
sumption that the more ideas available, the better--though 
of course at some point more ideas will add to confusion 
rather than enlightenment. The current state of broadcast 
programming however, is not too many ideas but too f e w .  34
The arguments for public access were founded, again, on philosophical 
tenets of the "marketplace of ideas." The importance of the Red Lion 
decision seems to be a move on the part of the Supreme Court to guaran­
tee that voices will be heard on electronic communications systems. But
the marketplace of ideas is much different from the economic marketplace
35that governs the present communication's industries.
34Ibld., p. 869.
Ibid.. p. 901.
CHAPTER VI
THE NEW YORK EXPERIENCE WITH PUBLIC ACCESS
It is significant to examine the public access experiment in New 
York City* not only because it was the first but because it serves as 
an example of one city's attempt to implement on a practical basis the 
complexities of the common carrier/public access principles,,
In the summer of 1970 two companies were granted franchises by the 
City of New York to provide cable television to the Borough of Manhattan. 
TelePrompTer, Inc. was awarded the franchise for the area north of 86th 
Street on the East Side and 79th Street on the West Side, while the 
franchise for the remainder of the borough was granted to Sterling 
Manhattan Cable Co. The two companies were to provide service to about 
90,000 homes.^ In exchange for the permission to lay cables in the City 
streets, the franchise issued by the Bureau of Franchises, required the 
companies to meet specified performance, construction, service delivery 
and technical standards. As this study is being written in late August, 
1973, the cable companies in New York City are required to have devel­
oped a 24-channel system; eleven of which may, be allocated to broadcast 
signals, one reserved for company use, three reserved to the City, four 
for "additional" use and four for public access programming. Prior to
_^_________ , Public Access in New York City; The New York Exper­
ience (A Report for the Fund for the City of New York by the Center for 
the Analysis of Public Issues), March 1972, p. 2.
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the completion of the present sys tem,seventeen channels were of fered of which
2
two were set aside for public access.
The public access channels are governed by the rules and regula­
tions issued by the Bureau of Franchises. The salient points are:
* There is no charge for public access channel time, 
although the companies may charge rentals for studio 
and equipment time.
* One of the two channels is reserved for one-time and 
"special" users, with special attention being required 
for last-minute users.
* The other channel is reserved for regular broadcasts 
with a limit of seven hours per week, (two in prime 
time) so that regular viewing constituencies can be 
developed.
* The companies may require pre-screening of all mater­
ial that may lead to legal action against them.
* The companies may require all necessary releases, copy­
right clearances, indemnifications, etc., they feel 
necessary to protect themselves from l i a b i l i t y , 3
The two cable companies in New York City were optimistic and enthu­
siastic about the possibility of public access television for three 
primary reasons. First was the potential of CATV for public service.
As the discussion of cable's potential increased, urban minorities and 
poverty became important topics. The Urban Institute in a proposal to 
the Sloan Commission in 1970 projected some of the minority-oriented 
services which CATV could provide: information on health, job opportu­
nities, welfare and adult education, drug abuse, legal aid, as well as 
enabling general community participation in local affairs.^ Other
2Jones, Regulation of Cable Television by the State of New York, 
Appendix F, p~ 5. ~
3 ... ...
__________ , The New York Experience, p. 22.
^__________ , "Potential Uses of Cable Communications in the Inner
City," (Report Prepared for the Urban Institute), November, 1970, pp. 1-10.
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organizations such as Urban Communications Group, headed by Theodore S. 
Ledbetter, Jr., the Office of Communication of the United Churches of 
Christ, headed by Reverend Everett C. Parker and others organized to 
represent the interests of the minorities and the poor in the develop­
ment of access to the CATV medium.
A second reason for the enthusiasm of New York City’s two cable 
companies was the abundant number of channels CATV could provide. The 
technological problems inherent in multi-channel systems has been dis­
cussed previously, but at the onset of cable’s introduction into New 
York City these problems were not known, particularly the problem of 
"ghost image" caused by tall buildings. At the time there were numer­
ous optimistic speculations about the unlimited number of channels 
available on a CATV system.
Finally, the development and marketing of lightx^eight, inexpensive
videotape recorders raised enthusiasm about the possibility of public
access. The effect of half-inch video equipment in liberating the
5
production process has been substantial. Sony marketed its first
half-inch Porta-Pak VTR in the summer of 1968,
Prior to this, video tape equipment was cumbersome, 
stationary, complex and expensive. Whereas tens of 
thousands of dollars were once needed to tool up for 
videotape, now only $1495 are required. In place of 
a machine weighing hundreds of pounds and requiring 
special power lines, all you need now is standard 
house current to recharge batteries which will let you 
use the 21-pound system anywhere, independent of exter- 
...... nal power.6
5Richard Calhoun, Public Television Channels in New York City; The
First Six Months (Washington, D.C.: Center for Policy Research, Inc.),
February, 19/2, p. 15.
Michael Shamberg, Guerilla Television (New York: Holt, Rinehart
and Winston, 1971), p. 5.
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The main advantages of the half-inch Sony Porta-Pak are its cheapness 
and simplicity of operation. It gives public access people the free­
dom to go out of the studio and get into the neighborhood. The sim­
plicity of the machine, according to most video culture groups, should 
destroy the ’’mystique of expertise’’ surrounding conventional television 
production.^
As part of New York City’s promulgation of the rules governing 
access, neither cable company charges for channel time for non-commercial
g
presentations though commercial users must pay $125 to $250 per hour.
In addition to the cable time itself, TelePrompTer provides free of
charge the studio equipment and personnel needed to tape and play a
simple one-camera, in-studio program, or to plan a pre-recorded program
in any of the formats for which TelePrompTer has equipment which include
16 mm film, Sony AV tape, and 1" Ampex 7500 tape. Additional equip*
ment and technical assistance, even a remote unit, are available at
additional charge. The arrangements at Sterling Manhattan are similar
with the exception of higher rates charged, partly because of the more
9
expensive 2” quadriplex tape equipment they use.
Evaluation of the Public Access Experience 
in New York City
According to all available research to date, there have been only 
two comprehensive studies conducted that have evaluated the public access
^Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 16. 
8
. The New York Experience, p. 7.
9
Ibid.
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experience in New York City. One study, Public Access Channels; The 
New York Experience, was published in March, 1972, by the Center for 
Analysis of Public Issues. The second study entitled Public Television 
Channel in New York City: The First Six Months, was extensively re­
searched by the Center for Policy Research, Inc. and released in 
February, 1972. The importance of New York City's experiment with 
public access was emphasized by both studies in that it represents the 
first time in this nation that cable television channels have been set 
aside for public use.
Since the development of public access television is 
one of the most portentous of the possible new appli­
cations of cable technology, and has been the subject 
of considerable professional and academic debate, the 
New York City experiment clearly warranted careful 
analysis.10
It was hoped that public access in New York City would represent - 
"a major step toward the political philosopher's dream of participatory 
democracy; the first genuine 'Town Meeting of the Air.
About four months after public access began, the New York Times 
stated:
Nearly four months after it began its widely heralded 
experiment in electronic democracy, Public Access Tele­
vision in New York is barely mumbling in the variegated 
community accents for which it was designed.
-Although the New York Times was rarely encouraging, there were numerous
^obstacles to the full development and use of public access facilities.
As the report researched by the Center for Policy Research stated:
1 0 T U - A  1Ibid., p. 1.
^Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 47.
12
New York Times, October 26, 1971.
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First, people simply didn't know about public access and
how simple it was to use; secondly, even where known,
without encouragement the public would adopt a reticent
attitude on the grounds that TV was only for the wealthy
and influential; thirdly, that public access was such a
new and highly localized phenomenon that there were no
model program formats available; fourthly, there were not
enough skilled production assistants available in spite of
TelePrompTer's offer of technical advice during "reasonable"
hours; fifthly, there was a paucity of equipment and
editing facilities that could only become more pronounced
as the demand for channel time increased; and sixthly, the
programming groups were from the outset being blocked from
one traditional means of financing production costs, that
is, local advertising, by a rule requiring programmers to
turn over 1007. of all monies derived from such sources to 
1 ^the companies•
The slow start of the public access experiment was not so much the
restrictive rules as it was the lack of understanding of the necessary
planning needed to get public television started. Many of the public
access advocates didn't fully understand the difficulties inherent in
attempting so set-up such an operation.
For instance, many people assume that since there are so 
many groups that seem to be making a tremendous amount of 
public noise of their desire for access that once access 
is there that people will just sort of step forth and 
flood the stations.
But the response to public access fell short of "flooding the stations."
After the opening ceremonies on July 1, 1971, very few groups or indiv-
15
iduals made use of public access. John Sanfratello,Director of Public
Access for Sterling, commented:
I don't think the people that brought up the suggestion 
of public access really knew what the hell they were 
talking about. I‘ don't think they had insight enough to
13
Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 38.
*^Ibid., p. 48.
1-5T * ‘Ibid.
101
look at it and say "You know, we’re starting something 
that our wildest imaginations never even thought about."
Well, they should have given it some consideration be­
fore it started, not wait until it was on, and then 
decide, "Okay, now we have it, what are we going to do 
with it?" or "How, who, will be paying for this?"^^
On the other hand, Ms. "Red" Burns of the New York University Alter­
nate Media Center has taken the position that public access could not 
and would not be an immediate success, no matter what kind of planning 
had gone into it prior to implementation. Ms. Burns' reasoning is based 
on the argument that the only evaluational index by which public access 
can be assessed is that traditionally applied to broadcast television. 
This scale is inapplicable to public access television because the dom­
inant characteristic in its make-up is scarcity of time, a factor which 
severely limits access to broadcast TV.
This scarcity factor is certainly not a feature of poly­
channelled CATV, and so such time-honored devices as 
audience ratings are no longer applicable to the measure 
of success.^
Yet such devices and expectations remain a part of the evaluational 
apparatus.
The educational or awareness problem was also immense. Most people 
never conceive of themselves as Using television for their own purposes. 
They are too used to be acted upon by the medium. "Television is still 
a land of electronic wizards and technical mysteries; the demystifica­
tion will take time."^
16Ibid., p. 49. 
^ Ibid., p. 50.
' - '■■■-   '   ■ ■ ■
 _______ , The New York Experience, p. 33.
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The Limitations of Ha If-Inch Video Equipment;
Chapter two of this study examined some of the technological prob­
lems in multi-channel cable systems. The New York City experience seems 
to clearly manifest some of these limitations.
The frustrating incompatibilities between tape units, the 
poor transmission quality of low-cost equipment, the lack 
of flexibility in the cable system itself, all make non­
studio public access presentations unnecessarily complex 
and occasionally impossible.19
Public access advocates speculated that the inexpensive, portable 
video equipment would take television into the neighborhoods. Unfor­
tunately, there are a number of problems with half-inch equipment which 
at times limit its users to the production of esthetically inferior, 
non-transmit table (over cable) tap’es. John Sanfratello, Director of
Public Access for Sterling, commented that technically there are a trem-
20
endous number of problems with the signals recorded on half-inch tape.
The amplifiers are not built to correct technical errors in half-inch
tape. So a cable company either refuses to transmit the signal, or if
they do, the picture is very inferior, to the point according to
Sanfratello, "that I don't think that very many people will watch it
21for a great length of time.
It is felt among those working with half-inch tape that its chief 
limitation is the impossibility of editing, unless it is dubbed 
onto more expensive (and less available) one-or-two-inch tapes. Attempts 
at electronic editing onto second generation half-inch tape will not
1 9 - -Ibid.
20 "  ■   ..................
Calhoun, Public Television Channels, p. 18,
21Ibid.
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transmit at all, while trigger editing (stopping and starting the camera
during taping) produces "glitches" or tape break-ups with each on-off 
22action. The easiest solution to the editing problem is to shoot in
real time“-that is, just let the recorder run without interruption,
recording everything that goes on. Another suggested method is to edit
half-inch tape and then have it shot off a TV monitor in a studio. The
only problem is that this method requires the cable operator to make
23permanently available, a properly aligned camera and monitor.
As yet, no technical standards have been formulated applicable 
to half-inch video equipment. It is questionable whether any standards 
could be established. The cable system's modulators and amplifiers are 
capable of transmitting "quality" signals on regular studio tape (one-or- 
two-inch), but not on half-inch. As a result of those considerations, 
the technical end of public access is still uncertain.
New York Public Television Channels Require 
Continuous Financial Support
Probably the most crucial of all problems that New York City public 
access groups faced was that of financing. Although usage of public 
access channels was slow during the summer, it picked up considerably 
during September and October, 1971. Most of the programming was gen­
erated by such groups as the Alternate Media Center, Filmmaker's Cooper­
ative, Friends of Haiti, The Federation of New York Tenants Organization, 
Raindance and the like. With the possible exception of Raindance, none
22Ibid., p. 19.
23
Ibid.
of the groups had any significant financial resources. Most of the
production costs were borne by grants and fellowships. Without adequate
provisions in the franchise granted by a city to a cable company for
25continuing support, public access may be stunted, if not halted. The 
different programming experiences of TelePrompTer and Sterling demon­
strate that free channel time, by itself, is not enough to generate 
significant spontaneous usage.
Under the proposed FCC rules allowing charges for produc­
tion facilities, for instance, the Alternate Media Center 
and Global Village will still get on the cable, but Philip 
Jordan, Marvin Tobak and the Friends of Haiti will be shut
out.26
Under the 1972 Cable Television Report and Order the FCC stipulates that 
cities can now charge a 5 percent franchise fee only if the city can show 
just cause. As of yet none of the city franchise agreements that have 
stipulated a franchise fee have channeled this money into supporting 
public access.
Liability Problem Fails> 
to be Significant
The New York experience with public access provides an example of 
how one cable system dealt with the legal hassles of liability. Sterling 
Cable Company's initial response was to draft a strongly-worded indemnif­
ication contract which would bind the public channel user to hold the 
cable company harmless in the event of suit, to pay for all legal expenses
__________ , The New York Experience, pp. 9-12.
25
Thomas Freebain, "Public Access in New York City: An Interview
“with Theadora Sklover," Yale Review of Law and Social Action, Vol. 2, 
1972, p. 236.
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and all judgments incurred by the cable company, and any other cable
system which carried the program and to allow the cable company to hire
counsel and appeal decisions virtually without limit. This contract,
which is of doubtful enforceability anyhow, was never signed by any users
27
of Sterling's public channels.
Out of protection, the City rules require that the cable companies 
receive material two weeks in advance of screening, but the companies
have been satisfied with submission 48 hours in advance, or even less
. , • 28 in some cases.
One proposal that was submitted to the Sterling Cable Company was
to require programmers on the public channels to post a bond to assure
that such liability could be met by them. This proposal was ignored
because it was unfeasible.
This is an unsound, even astounding, suggestion. No 
other communicator has to show solvency in order to 
speak or write. The very advantage of cable is to per­
mit low-cost access, and it would be inconsistent with 
that objective to impose a means test. Furthermore, 
bonding would be a disproportionstej^ burdensome condition, 
since liability would rarely arise.
Other proposals were reviewed by the two cable companies as there was
great concern over the liability issue. "In actual fact, liability prob-
30lems have not so far been a major obstacle to programming."
The only instances of censorship we have found to date 
was the deletion of an unusually explicit sexual scene 
and a refusal to show a film entirely about copulation.
^Ibid., p. 28.
28Ibid., p. 27.
29
Kestenbaum, Common Carrier Access to Cable Communications, p. 31.
30
__________ , The New York Experience, p. 27.
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Cfci other occasions, they have permitted shots of genitalia, 
and raised no objection to the extremely candid presentation 
by Consumers' Union on flammable clothing, with specific 
identification of manufacturers and retailers of flammable 
items.31
Both evaluation studies conducted on the experience in New York 
City with public television cautioned about generalizing from the exper­
ience in New York City to other localities. The current level of public 
access programming was certainly facilitated by the unusual media sophis­
tication of the New York users and the presence of a relatively large 
number of videotape groups and "media freaks," with amazing technical 
competence. This phenomena may be peculiar to the largest cities in 
the country, or possibly just to New York.
All in all, however, for all the shortcomings and prob­
lems to date, the New York City experience has been a 
heartening one. The overwhelming fact is that the channels 
are being used, spontaneously, by relatively large num­
bers of people, and for a variety of purposes. Issues of 
censorship and liability appear to be fading somewhat in 
importance as people concentrate on the business of pro­
ducing material for the channels. Program personnel at 
the cable companies have already remarked on the growing 
discrimination that users are beginning to show about 
organizing information for the most effective visual com­
munication. While this is no assurance, of course, that 
public access television has started on the right path, an
in the rightencouraging number of signs seem to be pointing 
J • x. • 32/ 'v n
31Ibid.
33Ibid., p. 36.
CHAPTER VII
CONCLUSIONS
The task of organizing and defining the complex technological, 
economic and political factors of a common carrier community antenna 
television system is unquestionably difficult. But out of the maze 
of regulatory contradictions, technological and economic uncertainty 
which this study has disclosed, several concepts appear to emerge.
Cable television was the unexpected by-product of gaps in program, 
coverage caused by the failure of the FCC to define goals and establish 
policy before economic forces became too powerful to resist.
The FCC provides an excellent example of what happens to an or­
ganization or agency which has not perceived its long range goals.
When faced by a challenge whose technology advances at a faster pace 
than its bureaucracy that agency has two options; impose a freeze or 
surrender. The FCC has not surrendered. The Commission has been so 
preoccupied x^ ith promoting program diversity and protecting local 
broadcast endeavors in spectrum broadcasting that it has failed to 
recognize that cable television could possibly fulfill these goals 
better than any other medium. Thus far the FCC's regulation of CATV 
has been based solely upon the degree of threat an industry poses for 
another rather than development of its own innate qualities. The capa­
bilities of cable television systems to perform various communication 
roles in a regulatory design allowing their unique flexibility to sup­
plement and enhance existing spectrum services has been almost
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completely ignored by the FCC. This has occurred because of the lack 
of understanding of the legal characteristics and economic potential 
of a cable operation. As a result the FCC has been able to measure 
cable only in terms of its effect upon a known quantity““spectrum 
broadcasting.
Throughout broadcast history the FCC has made several attempts 
to structure a new broadcasting system upon a concept of local service 
by local broadcasters and thereby promoting program diversity. A case 
in point is the Commission’s obsession with the healthy survival of UHF 
broadcasting. But in nearly every attempt the Commission's hopes have 
been frustrated by the harsh realities of the marketing structure.
In the case of spectrum broadcasting the FCC was forcing a local broad­
cast pattern upon an industry whose program and revenue distribution 
structures were largely formed by radio experience and upon a popula­
tion less predictable than the demographic data which it relied upon.
0
Despite FCC decrees, local television stations were not economically 
suited to provide local oriented programming and despite FCC hopes, 
the public seemed less concerned with local coverage than network 
entertainment programming.
It is doubtful, though, whether the FCC really has hoped for 
successful- local broadcast programming. The FCC is at best an under­
staffed, inefficient organization. The Commission seems to pay lip 
service to these hopes and considerations, but on a day-to-day admin­
istrative basis these idealistic goals do not appear to influence 
Commission decisions in particular cases. The FCC represents a fluke
in our democratic system. So often in the regulatory process those
"\
being regulated soon 7:ise to become the regulator simply because th-_* 
are the only ones who know what 5s happening* The Commission members 
depend heavily on broadcasters for a large portion of their research and 
on Congress which supervises their activiti.es, for their funds* Within 
this organizational structure it seems clear why the Commission is con- 
cerned with protecting the economic status of the regulated group*
ministrative policy-making, by virtue of the number of factors 
which must be weighed, requires^T^nkisiderable lead time over economic 
trends and technological development. This seems especially true in ■ 
the field of mass communication regulation with its complex public 
interest criterion. When the FCC attempts to implement this criterion 
it points to the Communication Act as the foundation for decision­
making* But the Communications Act, unlike the Interstate Commerce 
Act, as an example, is not designed to prevent the wasteful results of 
competition, block price wars or duplication of services; it simply 
allocates a scarce resource among competing applicants. The Communi­
cations Act has not served as an adequate regulatory tool to handle 
the economic and technological complexities which have emerged throughout 
broadcast history.
When these factors are considered it is perhaps easier to under­
stand why the FCC has been unable to see either the local service or 
diversity of programming aspects in terms of CATV. The Commission has 
the capacity of administering broadcast issues, but it does not seem 
to have the capacity to regulate electronic mass communications effec­
tively in the years ahead without considerable augmentation of its 
research ability.
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There is a chance that the misdirected, myopic vision of the Corn- 
mission can be altered. Probably for the first time in the history of 
electronic communication,. the technological developments are not com­
pletely ahead of the planned use. By 1977 all cable companies in the 
top 100 markets must have systems with 20-channel capacity. Some of 
these channels must be utilized on a common carrier or public access 
basis, But until that time, cable television for all practical purposes 
is a limited-access medium. This is a crucial point few persons have 
bothered to consider. Although potentially cable television has un- . 
limited channel access this is not a technological reality and it may 
not be for quite some time. There are several reception problems that 
must be worked out before cable can deliver a clear signal over a multi­
channel system.
The FCC has stated time and again that it will return to the com­
mon carrier issue as the industry develops. But unless the Commission 
formulates guidelines now it is doubtful whether it will face CATV 
common carrier operations with any greater skill than it has displayed 
in the past. Perhaps the FCC often procrastinates on important decision­
making policies because of the heavy workload required of this under­
staffed organization. There are too few manpower resources to adequately 
research the vast areas of communication which the FCC oversees.
One recommendation this study indicates would be to establish a 
new administrative commission that would deal exclusively with commu­
nity antenna television. There is an inherent risk in establishing a 
new administrative organization; that it will merely emulate the pol­
icies of its predecessor or serve the economic interest Of those who 
oversee its activities. To alleviate some of the danger this newly-
Ill
established Cable Commission should specify membership requirements.
The Cable Commission should have an odd number of members, say seven, 
of which not more than three would be directly related or employed by 
the CATV industry. At least two members should represent a minority 
group, one member should have economic and legal expertise and another 
should be drawn from the business profession. The commission members 
would be appointed by the President and approved by Congress. The 
function of this new Cable Commission would be tos 'a) adequately 
research areas of cable before policies are established, b) formulate , 
flexible guidelines for economic aspects of CATV, c) establish minimum 
technical standards and tests of performance, d) hold public hearings 
prior to any major, long-range decision making policy, and e) issue 
licenses and compliance certificates.
Realistically the establishment of a new commission will take a 
great deal of time. But it is essential that "objective" research get 
underway now so that when cable operators begin common carrier opera­
tions their efforts will not be subject to bureaucratic indecisiveness 
and hazy guidelines. No institution has the perspect5.ve to criticize 
itself adequately; outside consultants with different perspectives 
must be used, A research team should be appointed comprised of scholars 
economically unrelated to the broadcast industry, to thoroughly in­
vestigate the regulatory, economic and technological aspects of common 
carrier CATV. This research investigation should have four basic 
goals.
The researchers should determine the technological feasibility of 
common carrier access to cable television, The numerous technological
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problems that have arisen in multi-channel systems may make common 
carrier status impossible in some markets until devices or techniques 
can be developed to eliminate reception problems. There is a great 
deal of sophisticated broadcast equipment in the developing stages, 
but it must be economically marketable so as not to pose a burden on 
cable operators. Technical standards should be established for half- 
inch video equipment, Even with the best time base synchronizing 
equipment, half-inch remains an inferior broadcast product. Compati­
bilities between half-inch machines and studio playback units should 
be developed.
Long-range economic policies that will serve as guidelines for the 
top fifty markets, the second top fifty markets and the remaining markets 
should be determined. It is important that common carrier economic 
guidelines be formulated for each market classification because the 
economics of a major market like New York are much different from the 
economics of a market like Albuquerque. The issue of rate regulation 
is particularly crucial to common carrier operations. Rate regulation 
at the state level has been a dismal failure. Overregulation has 
almost halted cable growth in the states that assume regulatory respon­
sibilities over CATV. Economic guidelines for common carrier cable TV 
will be extremely difficult to research. The market structures and 
economic formulas have been largely determined. But if the research 
effort can make the cable markets aware of the economic pitfalls and of 
the options available, perhaps it will prevent the haphazard way state 
and local governments and cable systems have approached the issue of 
cable economics in the past. This information should be made readily 
available before communities embark on the franchising process.
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The research investigation should place the hypothetical fears of 
possible conflicts between cable operators as program originators and 
as common carriers on the same system into realistic perspective.
It seems that many of these unsettled issues such as liability and pos­
sible program conflicts have been generated to halt progress toward 
achieving common carrier access to CATV. There is great risk in for­
mulating long-range common carrier program guidelines on hypothetical 
information.
The last major goal of the research team should be an extensive 
examination of the New York experiment with public access. Although 
the New York experience may indeed be unique, it at least represents 
a model to examine. The two studies conducted thus far have merely 
examined the first layer. The notable success of New York*s public 
channels may be due in part to the numerous cultural facilities, 
diverse minority groups and educational centers upon which the public 
access groups could draw. But could a smaller, less culturally-diverse 
metropolitan area or community support a similar effort? A public 
access experiment should be tried in a smaller market. In some areas 
common carrier operations may prove to be impossible to sustain on 
either an economic or programming basis. To produce a one hour tele­
vision program is a back-breaking effort. The 1972 cable rules specify 
a government channel, an educational channel or local access channel.
To date no research has been conducted to determine if enough program­
ming can be generated at a local level to fill this time. An 
examination of the New York experience should offer suggestions to 
other communities on how to make citizens aware of public access and 
most importantly how to raise funds to channel franchise fees into the
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financing of public channels.
These four goals by no means represent all the aspects that need 
to be investigated, A foremost consideration of a common carrier cable 
research team or any futureregulatory body should be that common carrier 
and public access could hold the premise of providing a near-perfect 
local broadcast service which the FCC has spent years promoting. Some 
persons fear granting minority access to a broadcast medium that has been 
traditionally reserved for the middle and upper classes. This is why 
many efforts to sustain public access have been discouraged. But if 
goals of a political nature are placed above all other factors as the 
FCC has done in the past, the result will be a stifling of the natural 
economic and technological development of common carrier CATV.
Future modes of program delivery may face the same type of repres­
sion CATV has experienced. Laser beam or direct satellite broadcast 
links may pose future threats to CATV. The FCC, as now constituted, 
does not seem adept at facing new challenges with any greater insight 
than manifested in the past. There is a need for a new regulatory 
agency that has the time and resources to adequately project long-range 
goals and formulate policy. Cable television is not the last, but 
rather the first in a series of electronic transmission techniques of 
the future which will require a thorough and perceptive consideration 
of the proper regulatory action.
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